Valparaiso University Law Review
Volume 29
Number 1 Fall 1994

pp.235-284

Fall 1994

Multinational Corporations in the Aftermath of Bhopal: The Need
for a New Comprehensive Global Regime for Transnational
Corporate Activity
Sudhir K. Chopra

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sudhir K. Chopra, Multinational Corporations in the Aftermath of Bhopal: The Need for a New
Comprehensive Global Regime for Transnational Corporate Activity, 29 Val. U. L. Rev. 235 (1994).
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University
Law Review by an authorized administrator of
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu.

Chopra: Multinational Corporations in the Aftermath of Bhopal: The Need f

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE
AFTERMATH OF BHOPAL: THE NEED
FOR A NEW COMPREHENSIVE GLOBAL
REGIME FOR TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATE ACTIVITY
SUDHIR K. CHOPRA*

I. Introduction ....................................
II. Factual Setting of the Bhopal and Other Disasters ..........
A. Union Carbide--Bhopal, India ..................
B. Givaudan-Seveso & Meda, Italy ................
C. Nuclear Plant-Chernobyl, Ukraine (USSR) ...........
D. Sandoz-Basel, Switzerland ....................
III. The Adequacy and Responsiveness of the Law, Policy, and
Institutions in Industrial Disasters ...................
A. Bhopal . ................................
B. Seveso, Chernobyl, and Basel ...................
C. Lessons from the Bhopal & Seveso Accidents ..........

236
241
241
243
244
245

IV. International Guidelines-Development and Environment ....

258

A. Stockholm Declaration .......................
B. Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations and
the ILO Declaration .........................
C. The Earth Summit, 1992 ......................
V. An Appraisal ...............................
A. The Psychology of the Diplomatic Elite ..............
B. Assigning the Blame ........................
C. Development, Economic Cooperation, and the History of
International Law ..........................
VI. Recommendations for the Globalization of Environmental
Responsibility in Transnational Business Activity ..........

259

246
247
252
255

261
264
267
269
272
274
278

Adjunct Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. M.A., LL.B., Ph.D.
(Lucknow, India); J.D. (Northwestern, USA); LL.M. (Dalhousie, Canada); Candidate Ph.D. Law
(Tasmania, Australia). Formerly of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Department
of Environment, Government of India. The author served as Consultant/Legal Advisor to the law
offices of Kelly, Drye & Warren, New York, in the matter of the Union Carbide Bhopal Disaster.
The views expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not in any form or manner reflect
the views of the law firm or Union Carbide Corporation.
The author is thankful to Sir Geoffrey W.R. Palmer, P.C, K.C.M.G., A.C., Professor of Law
at Victoria University of Wellington and the University of Iowa, and former Prime Minister of New
Zealand, for his very helpful comments.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 [1994], Art. 3

236

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

The presentdivorce between the schools ofpoliticaleconomy

and law seems to me an evidence of how much progress in
philosophicalstudy still remains to be made. I
Oliver Wendell Holmes
I. ITRMODUCTION
The tragedy of Bhopal2 is long gone from the minds of the western public.
The commercial charisma that the news carried for some time is all but dead.
However, the victims of this accident continue to suffer and will endure further
suffering for decades to come. The urgency to find answers to avoid such
accidents in the future is also a bygone fact. Yet, the sheer magnanimity of the
loss of human life and sufferings dictate that further examination of the issues
related to this accident be carried on, at least until the ways and means of
thinking through the Bhopal quandary have been exhausted. This accident
presents to us many socio-legal issues that are much different than those
encountered in other industrial or environmental disasters. The accident is
exceptional, not because of the high number of human casualties 3 or the longterm ill effects on the health of the residents of that area," but because this
accident raised questions that were only feared and dealt with marginally in

1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 479 (1897).
2. A toxic gas called Methyl Isocynate (MIC) escaped from an underground storage tank of a
fertilizer plant on the night of December 2, 1984, in the city of Bhopal, India. This plant was
owned and operated by Union Carbide India, Ltd., a subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation of
the United States. The gas quickly spread over an area of 25 square miles, resulting in 1800 deaths
and affecting over 200,000 more people. The latest death total has been calculated at 4200 people.
Sanjeev Majupuria, A New Theory on Bhopal Leak, INDIA ABROAD, Mar. 5, 1993, at 30. See
generally Bhopal-W7at Really Happened, Bus. INDIA, Feb. 25-Mar. 10, 1985, at 102; Bhopal:
Cry of Death, INDIA TODAY, Dec. 31, 1984, at 6; Sanjoy Hazarika, Gas Leak in IndiaKills at Least
410 in City of Bhopal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1984, at Al; Stuart Diamond, The Bhopal Disaster:
How It Happened, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1985, at Al; Implications of the IndustrialDisaster in
Bhopal, India: Hearingbefore the Subcomm. on Asia and Pacific 4ffairs of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 6, 28 (1984) (statements of Robert A. Peck, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, and Ronald
Wishart, Vice President for Government Relations, Union Carbide Corporation); Ved P. Nanda &
Bruce C. Bailey, Export of Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Technology: Challenge for
InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 17 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 154, 165-70 (1988)."
3. Majupuria, supra note 2, at 30; Robert Stone, A U.S. Firm's Awful Legacy in India,
SAcRAmENTO BEE, Feb. 5, 1989, at 3; Bhopal's Over-At Leastfor Union Carbide, NEwSwEEK,
Feb. 27, 1989, at 54. An original estimate of 1800 dead was updated to 3300 dead in 1989; the
most recent figure indicates 4200 deaths as a consequence of the after-effects of the Bhopal disaster.
4. Anthony Spaeth, Court Settlement Snms Bhopal Survivors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1989,
at A12.
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international resolutions5 and the Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations. 6 This disaster has no equal in the annals of industrialized society.
It raises many distinct legal issues never before encountered in any other
accident. This fact alone necessitates a discourse that delves into the uniqueness
of this legal nightmare. Hence, the inquiry must examine the consequences on
the transnational corporations (TNCs), the exporters and importers of hazardous
substances and technology, and the general population to determine the cause of
such disasters. The desired result is to find safer and more secure ways of
conducting ultra hazardous activity, especially in third world countries. The
fragmented nature of the current legal regime that regulates transnational
corporate activity has failed thoroughly. No attempt has been made to question,
comprehend, or analyze the enormity of the scope of the TNCs' activity from
a world order perspective. A sense of global, human, social, economic,
environmental, and corporate justice is absent from the scholarly writings that
have emerged in the aftermath of Bhopal. The answer must be sought in a

5. The origin of the Code of Conduct for Trananational Corporations can be found in the U.N.
Declarations on New International Economic Order. The three Resolutions passed by the United
Nations General Assembly are: Declaration on the Establishment ofa New International Economic
Order, May 9, 1974, G.A. Res. 3201, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.1), at 3, U.N. Doe. A/9559
(1974); A Programme ofAction on the Establishment ofa New International Economic Order, May
16, 1975, G.A. Res. 3202,29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.1), at 5, U.N. Doe. 1/9559 (1974); and The
Charter ofEconomic Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 12, 1974, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 31), at 50, U.N. Doe. A/9631 (1975). For a detailed discussion of the Code of
Conduct, see William C. Burns, The Report ofthe Secretary General on Transnational Corporations
and Industrial Process Safety: A CiticalAppraisal, 3 GBo. INT'L ENVrL. L. REv. 55 (1990). The
main objective of these resolutions was to integrate developing countries in a global economy. See
Gamani Corea, UNCTAD and North-South Dialog, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
78 (Rafael Guitidrrez Girardot et al. eds., 1982); see also Norbert Horn, Normative Problems of
New International Economic Order, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 338 (1982).
6. UNrED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT DRAFT INTERNATIONAL
CODE OF CONDUCr ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, May 6, 1980, reprinted in 19 INT'L
LEGAL MATERLALs 773 (1980). The principle objective of the Code is to improve the standard of
living in developing countries by improving the flow of technology and technological information
to third world nations. For a detailed discussion of the Code of Conduct, see generally S.K.
Agrawala, Transfer of Technology to LDC's: Implications of the Proposed Code, 23 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 246, 247 (1983); Pieter Sanders, Implementing International Codes of Conduct for
Multinational Enterprises, 30 AM. J. CoMP. L. 241 (1982); Detlav Vagts, The Global Corporation
and International Law, 6 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 247 (1972); Vicki R. Patton-Hulce, Comment,
Multinational Corporations and Lesser Developed Countries-Foreign Investment, Transfer of
Technology, and the Paris Convention: Caveat Investor, 5 U. DAYTON L. REV. 105 (1980). In
addition to the Code referred to here, the International Labor Organization-through "A Tripartite
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy," ILO Labor
Office, CH-1211 Geneva 22 (1977)-recommended that: "(1) the TNCs shall give priority to local
personnel in employment, (2) the TNCs shall use technologies which generate employment, (3) the
TNCs shall provide workers with information about the firm to allow meaningful negotiations," and
(4) the governments "should promote good labor and employment practices.* See Robert Grosse,
Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 16 . WORLD TRADE L. 414 (1982).
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manner that addresses this problem from a long-term, global perspective.
At first, this Article shall attempt to establish the differences between
Bhopal and other industrial disasters. Then it shall explore the causes of the
deficiencies in the existing politico-legal framework that is designed to regulate
and direct international business activities of the transnational corporations. This
is followed by an analysis of the deep-rooted mistrust between developed and
developing countries, as evidenced' by the psychology and perceptions about
"harm," "risk," and "development."
Perhaps then the necessity can be
established for yet another international legal regime that can regulate
transnational corporate activity effectively. A developing nation needs to be
assured not only of the transfer of technology that has become redundant on the
cost-benefit scale of business profitability in environmentally conscious
developed countries, but also of the transfer of such technology that is absolutely
safe to conduct ultra-hazardous activity in any part of the world.7 Such
measures are necessary to remedy the problems encountered during lengthy
litigation, which seems to have failed to mitigate the pain and suffering inflicted
upon the victims of the Bhopal tragedy.
The best course is to develop stricter measures that will eliminate the
possibility of "cost-benefit" related disasters. Interestingly, the culprits of the
cost-benefit approach are both the importers of hazardous technology and
substances and the TNCs. While the latter are usually willing to export cheaper,
redundant technology to their foreign subsidiaries because of the exclusion of
environmental cost, the former is satisfied because the imported technology is
cheaper and is also responsible for creating new jobs." Both parties in such a
scenario are concerned with the immediate cost factor. The total cost that will
be required to remedy the long-term ill effects on the human population, which
can easily be averted by early investment in environmentally conscious and safe
technology, is completely ignored.
Many scholars of international environmental law have discussed and
written on the Bhopal tragedy from an international law perspective.9 However,

7. See generally Judith L. Ugelow, A Survey of Recent Studies on Costs of Pollution Control
and the Effects on Trade, in ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 167 (Seymour Rubin & Thomas R. Graham
eds., 1982).
8. See generally Ingo Walter, InternationalEconomic Repercussions of EnvironmentalPolicy:
An Economist's Perspective, in ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE, supra note 7, at 22; Charles Pearson,
Environment and InternationalEconomic Policy, in ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE, supranote 7, at 46.
9. Remarks by Robert Lutz, Ved Nanda, David Wirth, Danial Magraw, and. Gunther Handl,
in Shelly P. Batham, International Transfer of Hazardous Technology and Substances: Caveat
Emptor or State Responsibility?, 79 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 303, 303-22 (1985) [hereinafter
InternationalTransfer]. The discussion at this panel raised some very fundamental questions about
the applicability of the international law of state responsibility to situations such as Bhopal. Some
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the reality is that not one aspect of public international law was applied in the
Bhopal case to help resolve the dilemma faced by the victims. 0 Some
international lawyers examine the problem from the perspective of state
responsibility, some take the human rights angle, and still others emphasize the
point of the responsibility of the parent company to consider the Code of
Conduct for Transnational Corporations." In reality, every aspect of this case
has been considered under the municipal laws of either the United States or
India, with both countries following the common law system but exhibiting
different applications and interpretations.' 2 An urgent need exists to narrow
this gap between the international law process and the municipal law approach.
The primary difference between a Bhopal-type tragedy and other industrial
disasters is that while the latter could be resolved effectively under international
law, the former must find recourse in the domestic laws of the countries
involved. One of the major problems is the lack of an appropriate and effective
international legal system to provide a speedy resolution of the issues
involved. 3 A system is needed that is designed to provide not only a code of
conduct, but also an enforceable legal framework based on sound principles of
global justice under which the activities of TNCs can be regulated in much the
same way as if they were in their home countries. A binding dispute settlement
mechanism is also needed either in the form of a "court of arbitration" or a
more innovative "international corporate dispute settlement court." Another
option would be to change the current structure and jurisdiction of the

of the questions raised were about the role of the Code of Conduct of International Labor
Organisation on transnational activity, the United Nations Economic and Social Council, the U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development, and the EEC. Other issues raised were whether there can
be liability without a violation of international law and whether international law imposes a
responsibility on states to provide quick relief to the victims of these disasters.
10. UPENDRA BAXI & THOMAS PAUL, MASS DISASTERS AND MULTINATIONAL LIABILTY: THE
BHOPAL CASE (1986) [hereinafter MASS DISAS'rERS]; UPENDRA BAXI, INCONVENIENT FORUM AND
CONVENIENT CATASTROPHE: THE BHOPAL CASE (1986) [hereinafter INCONVENIENT FORUM];
UPENDRA BAXI & AMITA DHANDA, VALIANT VICTIMS AND LETHAL LrrIOATION: THE BHOPAL
CASE (1990) [hereinafter VALIANT VICTIMS]. Complete material on Bhopal litigation starting with
the government of India's complaint in the Southern District Court in New York up to the final
settlement of the case by the Supreme Court of India is presented in these three books. Also, the
introduction to each book, all written by Professor Upendra Baxi, provide a very able and rational
criticism of the various rulings, both Indian and American. For legal developments after Bhopal to
strengthen environmental laws in India, see generally C.M. Abraham & Sushila Abraham, The
Bhopal Case and the Development of EnvironmenlalLaw in India, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 334
(1991).
11. See InternatonalTransfer, supra note 9, at 310, 315, 318 (remarks by David Wirth, Danial
Magraw, and Gunther Handl).
12. See generally VALIANT Vicrims, supra note 10, at 310.
13. David Wirth writes that '[t]here is relatively little that can be characterized as comprising
a traditional body of law establishing international standards for export of substances prohibited or
regulated in the country of origin. There are few, if any, multilateral agreements or decisions of
international tribunals addressing this matter." InternationalTransfer, supra note 9, at 310.
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International Court of Justice so that it could rule on the cases involving
transnational business activity.
It is time for both the transferor and the transferee of hazardous materials
or any sophisticated technology to stop depending upon cleverly drafted but
meaningless resolutions and codes of conduct reflecting the accommodations
reached by negotiators taking opposite positions as a result of their bureaucratic
mentality. Unfortunately, these crafty instruments of international legal
literature are self-defeating. In most cases, the language of such resolutions
projects one and only one view; that is, all interest groups have agreed to
disagree, and, therefore, the negotiators have failed to evolve intellectually. Of
what good is the jungle of documents created by these fancy international
organizations if they cannot deliver an iota of satisfaction to the poor masses of
our so-called civilized universe? When we encounter a situation like this, we
are forced to reassess our profound claims to wisdom. Immediately, a feeling
about the inadequacy of traditional methods of negotiation comes to mind. If we
are to evolve beyond the current stalemate to prove that we are not a static
society, then an innovative experiment is necessary. To demonstrate an
understanding of the dynamic process of scientific advancement and to justify
our claims to mankind's overall social progress, we need to show that industrial
progress is taken into consideration in the international law-making process. We
ought to recognize that the parity between social and industrial development is
a prerequisite to true progress.
We are now approaching the end of the third century of the industrial
revolution. 4 At a time when the West claims that its civilization has matured,
we find ourselves facing the reality that the fruits of the Industrial Revolution
have failed to spread beyond the borders of western countries. Poverty and
famine in the Third World continue to be a sad reality.15 The East and the
South continue to suffer from the lack of basic necessities. The challenge now
is how to embrace humanity in its entirety so that some very basic aspirations
of mankind can be satisfied. If the Berlin wall can come down and if the
Russian economy can experiment with free enterprise while the rest of the
Eastern Block rushes to embrace the market economy, then the laws regulating
international trade and business activity can be restructured.
In an era of environmental crisis and changing perceptions of the global

14. Epac ROLL, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 79 (5th ed. 1992).
15. See generally AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENITrLEMENT AND
DEPRIvATION (1991). Professor Sen writes that "not everything about poverty is quite so simple.
Even the identification of the poor and the diagnosis of poverty may be far from obvious when we
move away from extreme and raw poverty.... [M]ost importantly-the causation of poverty raises
questions that are not easily answered." Id. at vii.
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economy, it is now not only obvious but necessary that the old institutions be
replaced with new thinking. In this invigorated era of globalism-whether
termed environmentalism or an interdependent global economy-a Grotian
approach is needed. New and bold ideas must be injected to replace old,
ineffective ones. Vattalism, a belief in simply grooming the existing laws and
institutions, is unlikely to work. Admittedly, Vattalism goes well with the
current bureaucratization of international law. The Grotian innovationism is
bound to receive resistance from the guards of established order. Yet, an
experiment with a stream of new ideas will most certainly help replace the postcolonial structure of international trade. Even though the ideas which take into
account global interdependence for survival and the need for TNCs to be
financially viable are important, it is equally, if not more, important that
developing countries receive the benefits of the technological revolution in a way
that reduces the gap between the "haves" and "have nots."" 6
II. FACTUAL SETTING OF BHOPAL AND OTHER DISASTERS

A.

Union Carbide-Bhopal,India

The Bhopal disaster occurred at a plant owned and operated by Union
Carbide India, Ltd. (UCIL),"7 a subsidiary of the Union Carbide Corporation
(UCC) incorporated in New York. The parent company owned 50.9 % of the
total stock of the subsidiary, whereas Indian-government-owned corporations'

with a significant representation on the board of directors of UCIL owned 22%

16. Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND LAW 137 (Sterling M.
McMurrin ed., 1987); see aLso AMARTYA SEN, INMQUALITYREEAMINED 12-30 (1992) (questioning
the veracity of utilitarian philosophy that is founded in Bentham's theory and based on a refinement
of Adam Smith's political economy). Professor Sen's analysis is thorough and proves that the
foundations of our current political economy are faulty and unlikely to deliver economic equality to
the poor. See generaLty PATRICIA H. WERHANE, ADAM SMITH AND His LI.EACY FOR MODERN
CAPITALISM (1991) (suggesting that a careful reading of Adam Smith's major works reveals that
justice, not self-interest or benevolence, is the most basic virtue to Smith, and that a system of
natural jurisprudence is necessary for a viable and ideal political economy).
17. Note that Indian and American courts refer to Union Carbide, Ltd., as UCIL, whereas the
American papers frequently refer to UCIL as UCI.
18. Charan La Sahu v. Union Carbide, Judgment of the Supreme Court of India, Writ petition
No. 258 (1989), at 2; [19891 1 S.C.C. 674; [1989] 2 S.C.C. 540; [19891 3 S.C.C. 38, reprinted
in VALIANT VICTIMS, supra note 10, at 551-635. Unit Trust of India and Life Insurance
Corporation of India is indicated to own 22% of Union Carbide India stock. VALIANT VICTIMS,
supra note 10, at 551. However, according to the written statement filed by Union Carbide U.S.,
of the 23,504 shares, 23,000 shares were owned by Indians. Statements also indicated that in
December 1984, 24.85 % of the stock was controlled by government-owned organizations. In
addition to the corporations mentioned above, the following corporations were also stockholders:
Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation, Industrial Development Bank of India, Industrial
Finance Corporation of India, and General Insurance Corporation of India. See VA.IAT VICTIMS,
supra note 10, at 36.
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of the stock. At the time of the accident, only one American citizen was serving
on the Board of Directors of UCIL while living in Hong Kong. UCIL was a
foreign company incorporated in India and subject to Indian laws, regulatory
provisions, and policies. The day-to-day business of the company was
controlled by the Indian directors who formed the majority on the Board of
Directors of UCIL. Although a general design was sold to the subsidiary by the
parent company,19 it was developed and subsequently modified by UCIL locally
and approved by the various regulatory agencies of the Indian government.'
This is a classic case of the transfer of hazardous substances and technology to
a third world country by a TNC. The technology in question was provided by
the parent company on a very specific demand by the recipient country. 2 This
is a perfect example of a developing country seeking hazardous technology for

19. Stuart Diamond, Carbide Gives Details on Its Sabotage Claim, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 18,
1986, at 29. As reported, UCC sold 'general design drawings to its Indian subsidiary, which then
hired companies to do detailed design and construction." Id. 'The parent company trained some
of the plant managers, but was unable to dictate the plant's daily operations .... " Id. However,
the Indian government blamed Union Carbide for errors in the design, management, and an
oversight of the Bhopal plant. Id. Specifically, the government stated that "unreasonable and highly
dangerous defective plant conditions" were responsible for the accident. Id. See also Matt Miller,
Two Years After Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster,Lingering Effects Still
PlagueIts People, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 5, 1986, at A34; India Sues Union Carbide in Bhopal: Case Differs Little from One Filed in
U.S., 9 INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA), 343 (1986).
20. According to the 1973 agreement for the sale of the design, which was approved by the
Indian government, the parent company was not to be "inany way liable for any loss, damage,
personal injury, or death" resulting from the design specifications sold. Diamond, supra note 19,
at 29. '[The] Indian government had approved and inspected the plant, [it]
knew about the dangers
of MIC, and [it] refused to allow American employees from [Union] Carbide to remain in India to
provide technical assistance requested by its subsidiary to the Indians running the plant." Id. The
Indian government, by a letter dated March 13, 1972, authorized UCIL to set up an MIC plant to
manufacture 5000 tons of MIC-based pesticides at Bhopal. See VALIANT VICTIMS, supra note 10,
at 39.
21. One commentator has stated:
The Bhopal plant was constructed by UCIL pursuant to Indian government policies, laws
and regulations which required the complete back integration of production facilities.
UCIL, in compliance with the stated government policies and regulations, was forced
to back-integrate and build the Bhopal plant, even though it would have been much more
desirable financially both for [diefendant and for UCIL to continue to import MIC from
the [d]efendant. UCIL had no desire to incur the huge capital expenditure of building
a pesticide plant; however, the Central Government's laws and policies required such
construction.
VALANT VicrMs, supra note 10, at 202. See also Charan Lal Sahu v. Union Carbide, Judgment
of the Supreme Court of India, Writ petition No. 258 (1989), at 2; In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas
Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 855-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See generally Guinther Handl,
EnvironmentalProtectionand Development in 7hird World Countries: Common Destiny-Common
Responsibility, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 603 (1988); Craig D. Galli, Note, HazardousExports
to Third World: The Need to Abolish the Double Standards, 12 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 71 (1987);
Maureen Bent, Note, Exporting Hazardous Industries: Should American Standards Apply?, 20
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 777 (1988).
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much-needed development and then redesigning and modifying the technology
according to the local needs and expertise.'
In the case of the Bhopal disaster, the following facts can be identified: 1)
a subsidiary of a TNC operated in a third world foreign country; 2) the
subsidiary was subject to local laws, regulation, and control and not the laws
controlling and regulating the parent company; 3) the parent company was not
free to manage and operate its subsidiary's plant by way of providing technical
and personnel assistance; 4) no effects of the accident were experienced outside
the borders of India except for the economic effects on the parent company; 5)
in addition to ecological damage in the region, the primary damage was the loss
of human life and human suffering; 6) a case was filed in the United States in
order to circumvent Indian laws and acquire jurisdiction over the parent
company; 7) no international law was referred to in the course of litigation,
either in the United States or in India.'
B. Givaudan-Seveso & Meda, Italy
From a legal perspective, the accident most similar to Bhopal occurred on
July 10, 1976, in Meda, Italy at a plant owned by the Givaudan corporation, a
subsidiary of the Swiss corporation Hoffman LaRoche.'
The accident was
caused by malfunctioning safety equipment that lead to the release of an
extremely toxic gas, dioxin.'
The neighboring town of Seveso was most
affected by the incident; thus this accident is commonly called the Seveso
incident. Without doubt, this accident caused heavy ecological damage and
widespread contamination to several cities.'
Similarities- aside, there are
marked differences between the Bhopal and Seveso situations.
In contrast to the facts of the Bhopal tragedy, the Seveso incident is
characterized by the following facts: 1) both the parent company and the

22. This case is a typical example of the problems faced in the third world countries.
Technology-importing countries modify plant designs to accommodate their growing developmental
needs. These modifications are not always environmentally safe nor even economically sound. In
India, the tendency is to adopt labor intensive methods and to create as many jobs as possible.
Generally, third world countries prefer to import labor intensive technology and then modify it to
suit their needs, which often compromises safety features. Governmental interference to assure that
foreign multinationals generate maximum local employment is very common.
23. Diamond, supra note 19, at 29.
24. Melton S. Davis, Under the Poison Cloud, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 10, 1976, at 20.
25. Poison Cloud's Effects Still Baffle Italy's Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1978, at 3. For
a detailed discussion of the Seveso accident, see generally Nanda & Bailey, supra note 2, at 163-67.
26. Commission Reports on Causes of Seveso: Makes General Suggestions for New Rules, 1
INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 246 (Aug.10, 1978) [hereinafter Commission Reports]. See also Nanda
& Bailey, supra note 2, at 164.
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subsidiary were located in developed countries, with no involvement from a
third world country; 2) the subsidiary was subject to local laws, which if
properly observed and effectively enforced would have reduced the possibility
of such an accident;" 3) the parent company was closely involved in running
its subsidiary;' 4) the cases were filed and adjudicated both in Italy and
Switzerland but without the intent to circumvent the Italian law,' and major
settlements were reached outside the courts; 5) the case was settled basically
between the subsidiary, the Italian government, and the city of Seveso, 0 and
a settlement was reached between the subsidiary and the victims even though the
parent company was willing to accept responsibility; 3' 6) the main damage was
ecological, combined with some human suffering but with no deaths; and 7) the
effect beyond the borders of Italy was again economic and marginal.'
C. Nuclear Plant-Chernobyl, Ukraine (USSR)
While the cases of Bhopal and Seveso have a few similarities, the case of
Chernobyl is very different. The Chernobyl accident of April 26, 1986, was
caused by a chemical explosion resulting in the meltdown of one of the four

27. [Clharges against the mayor of Meda [Italy] and local health officials were initially filed
and then later dropped. The charges were based upon the officials' failure to apply existing
legislation which could have avoided the disaster." Nanda & Bailey, supra note 2, at 165.
28. Commission Report, supra note 26, at 246; Nanda & Bailey, supra note 2, at 164. The
parent company and subsidiary were both accused of hiling to inform the Italian authorities about
the nature of the operations and of failing to install automatic control and warning devices.
Commission Reports, supra note 26, at 246; Nanda & Bailey, supra note 2, at 164-65.
29. In the case of Bhopal, from the beginning, both the victims and the Indian government tried
to reach the parent company by filing cases in a United States federal court. Under the Indian laws
then in effect, the parent company could not be sued for the wrongs of its subsidiary. The tort law
doctrine of absolute liability for ultrahazardous activity, with all of its exceptions, was in force. See
Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. All regulated industries were excluded from absolute
liability. Id. Other exceptions such as contributory negligence, consent, and statutory activities are
discussed in other cases. See, e.g., Marlor v. Ball, [1900] 16 TLR 239; Narayananv. Government
of Travancore-Codin, 1956 A.I.R. 225 (S.C.); Madras Ry. Co. v. Zamindar of Carvatenagarum
(1874) 11. App. 364. Indian corporate law, like English corporate law, has preserved the corporate
identity. See A. RAMAYA, G1DB TO THE ComPAmmS AcT §34, at 112-15 (J.C. Shah et al. eds,
10th ed. 1984); AvrAR SINoH, INDIAN CoMPANY LAw 11-23 (6th ed. 1979) (stating that Indian law
does not permit piercing of the corporate veil to reach the parent company except in the case of
fraud or tax evasion, and traditionally, courts have protected the sanctity of an incorporated body).
30. Figuresfor Seveso Compensation at Odds with ItalianAnnouncement, 3 INT'L ENVTL. REP.
(BNA) 242 (June 11, 1980); Seveso Files Suit in Geneva Court Seeking Damages for Dioxin
Disaster,2 INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 574 (Mar. 10, 1979); Nanda & Bailey, supra note 2, at 164.
31. Commission Reports, supra note 26, at 246; Nanda & Bailey, supra note 2, at 164.
32. See Nanda & Bailey, supra note 2, at 164. In the case of Bhopal, the parent company was
asked to pay most of the settlement, $425 million, while the subsidiary was asked to contribute $45
million. VALIANT VICTIMS, supra note 10, at 527-32. In the case of Seveso, the subsidiary paid
$80 million to the Italian government and an additional $72 million to the city of Seveso. Nanda
& Bailey, supra note 2, at 164.
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reactors at the Chemobyl nuclear power plant.33 Without doubt, this was the
worst nuclear power plant accident in history, killing thirty-one workers and
causing acute radiation problems for several hundred more.'
Differences between the two accidents discussed earlier and the Chemobyl
explosion are numerous: 1) Chemobyl involved a government-owned operation
with no TNC or foreign ownership in question; 2) the plant was subject to the
local laws of the former Soviet Union; 3) the former Soviet government ran the
operation with no foreign corporate involvement; 4) the accident perfectly
demonstrated the concept of the public international law of state responsibilit? 5
because the former Soviet Union as a state was responsible for both the
ecological and financial damage incurred by injured countries; 5) interestingly,
the question of damage compensation was raised by the European Parliament
and not by individual countries in any court of law;3' 6) the transboundary
effect of the accident was felt all over Europe;37 and 7) the main damages from
the accident came in the form of long-term radiation pollution, ecological
damage, dislocation of economic activity, and long-term health problems.
D. Sandoz-Basel, Switzerland
The Sandoz accident involved a major toxic chemical spill in the Rhine that
occurred at Basel, Switzerland, on November 1, 1986. The spill caused
approximately 1246 tons of toxic chemical to be released into the Rhine River,
adversely affecting France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.' The

33. For a detailed discussion of the accident, see Nanda & Bailey, supra note 2, at 170-76.
See also Some Facts on ChernobylRevealed, 9 INr'L ENvrL. REP. (BNA) 139-40 (May 14, 1986).
34. See Nanda & Bailey, supra note 2, at 173.
35. See generally Gfnther Handi, Transboundary Nuclear Acciden: The Post-Cherobyl
MultilateralLegislative Agenda, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 203 (1988); INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE
RESPONSIBILIT FOR INJURIEs TO ALI NS (R. Lillich ed., 1983).
36. OECD, The Accident at Chemobyl-Economic Damageand Its Compensation in Western
Europe, 39 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 58 (1987). See Nanda & Bailey, supra note 2, at 176.
37. Increased radiation levels were found in Scandinavia, Poland, France, United Kingdom,
Finland, Italy, Ireland, and West Germany. See Some Facts on ChernobylRevealed, supra note 33,
at 140; Government Withhold InformationtMenSays RadiationLevels Not Serious, 9 INT'L ENvTL.
RE P. (BNA) 188 (June 11, 1986); EEC Lifts Ban on East European FoodImports, Substitutes U.S.
Limits on RadiationLevels, 9 INT'L ENvrL. REP. (BNA) 189 (June 11, 1986); RadiationLevels from
ChernobylPrompt Limits on Livestock Slaughter,10 INT'L ENV'L. REP. (BNA) 442 (Sept. 9, 1987);
Effects of Chernobyl in Finland, 9 INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 420 (Nov. 12, 1986); Excess
Radioactivity Found in Birds that Fly Through Chernobyl Contamination, 9 INT'L EN TL. REP.
(BNA) 272-73 (Aug. 13, 1986); No U.S. Effects Seen, 9 INT'L ENV. REP. (BNA) 140 (May 14,
1986).
38. Paul Lewis, Huge Chemical Spill in the Rhine Creates Havoc in Four Countries, N.Y.
TMES, Nov. 11, 1986, at 1; French, Germans Complain About Notice ofFire at Sandoz Chemical
Plant in Basel, 9 INT'L ENvrL. REP. (BNA) 389-90 (Nov. 12, 1986) [hereinafter French, Germans
Complain]. See also EGLI Promises "RadicalMeasures' to Prevent Future Incidents like Sandoz,
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factual setting of the Sandoz accident is very different than those of Bhopal and
Seveso because: 1) the Sandoz case involves a large TNC operating in its
country of incorporation; 2) no involvement of a subsidiary or any operations
in another country was in question; 3) the parent company was subject to the
laws and standards of its country of incorporation; 4) the parent company was
free to operate, regulate, and effectuate its own standards and activities; 5) no
cases were filed in any domestic courts; 6) settlement of damages was taken up
between the French and Swiss governments at the same time, thus invoking the
international law of state responsibility, 7) the main damage caused by this
spill was ecological, especially the loss of marine life in the Rhine River; and
8) the effects of this accident went beyond the borders of Switzerland, causing
40
significant economic damage to the fishing industries in the injured states.
Im.

THE ADEQUACY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE LAW,
AND INSTITUTIONS IN INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS

POLICY,

Each of the four cases discussed in Section II has been dealt with in a
different way and under a different set of laws. While Chernobyl and Sandoz
are the textbook examples of state responsibility cases, Bhopal and Seveso are
not. In the latter cases, new laws were created judicially or legislatively to
address the problems.4 ' However, these laws are very limited in scope. They
neither address the causes of such accidents nor satisfy the aspirations and

9 INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 429-41 (Dec. 10, 1986) [hereinafter Radical Measures]; Government
Bills Swtzerland, 10 INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 3-7 (Jan. 14, 1987); Nanda & Bailey, supra note
2, at 176-78.
39. Government BilLs Switzerland, supra note, 38 at 3; Sandoz and French Government Settle
for Pollution Claim for 46 Million Francs, 10 INT'L ENVrL. REP. (BNA) 492 (Oct. 14, 1987);
Nanda & Bailey, supra note 2, at 177.
40. See generally French, Germans Complain, supra note 38, at 389-90; Nanda & Bailey,
supra note 2, at 177-78.
41. Radical Measures, supra note 38, at 429-30; EEC Callsfor Immediate Closure, 9 INT'L
ENvrL. REP. (BNA) 180 (June 11, 1986). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated
that Union Carbide USA shall:
(1) consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of India and continue to waive defenses
based on the statute of limitations, (2) agree to satisfy any judgment rendered by Indian
Court against it and upheld on appeal . . . ; (3) be subject to discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the United States.
VALIANT VICrIMS, supra note 10, at 655. These three conditions have set an unprecedented
example whereby a foreign multinational can now be reached without piercing the corporate veil of
the subsidiary, and much more liberal discovery laws are available to foreign states to reach the
records of a multinational. See id. Also, it is important to note that the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster
Act of 1985 passed by the Government of India, which came into force on March 29, 1985, created
a new example whereby the Government of India assumed the responsibility as parenspatriaeto
represent Indian victims while at the same time being a codefendant along with UCIL before the
Indian courts.
This is a unique example wherein a defendant is also a plaintiff. See MAss
Dtismts, supra note 10, at 11-16.
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desires of the victims. This inquiry will begin with the Bhopal case because the
thesis of this Article is that Bhopal is unique because, unlike all other accidents,
it involved a developing country; yet, it is typical of the events leading up to and
following a North-South 4 commercial disaster.
A. Bhopal
In the case of Bhopal, it was often said that the old rustic laws of India
were inadequate to respond to the situation. The central government's policy
to keep itself out of the reach of victims was also discussed. Both factors were
indeed a major hurdle for the victims in this search for justice and constituted
the prime reasons why the victims filed cases in the U.S. courts. Another
commonly ignored aspect of the Bhopal case is that if UCIL was the only target
of Bhopal litigation, then the investment of Indian Government-owned insurance
companies would have been affected. These investments accounted for about
22% of the ownership of UCIL.43 The mystery as to the insurer of UCIL in
India can only be unfolded by realizing that, at the time of accident, there were
no private insurance companies in India. The two largest corporate insurance
companies were stockholders of UCIL. This scenario leaves the question of
whether the Indian government's objective in filing the case in the U.S. courts
was to seek compensation for the victims, to avoid the responsibility of the*
insurers of the Indian subsidiary, or to save the capital invested by governmentowned investment companies in UCIL. 4 In fact, the final settlement ordered
by the Indian Supreme Court divides the liability between the parent and the
subsidiary. By allocating $45 million to be paid by the subsidiary, which
affected the holdings of the Indian-government-owned corporations, the Supreme
Court of India acknowledged that the Indian subsidiary could not be absolved of
its responsibility. 45
However, this was not the only reason for filing the case in the U.S. The
problem also involved the substantive laws of India. First, under the Companies
Act, neither the victims nor the Indian government could have secured
jurisdiction over the parent company without proving that the activities of the
subsidiary were fraudulent or were for the purpose of tax evasion.' Obviously
this was not the case, and piercing the corporate veil was thus not a viable

42. "North-South" is a standard term in United Nations documents and is used to refer to
developed countries (North) versus developing countries (South). It also represents the sharp
division of the United Nations into two interest blocks.
43. See Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, Judgment of the Supreme Court of India, Writ
petition No. 268 (1989), at 2, cited in VALJANT VICTIMS, supra note 10, at 550.
44. VALIANT VICTIMS, supra note 10, at 550.
45. See Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, Civil Appeal Numbers 3187-88 of 1988,
order dated Feb. 14, 1989, at 2, cited in VALIANT VICTIMs, supra note 10, at 527-28.
46. See RAMAIYA, supra note 29, at 112-15; SINGH, supra note 29, at 11.
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approach. Furthermore, the concept of strict liability was not in force in India
at the time of the accident. The old doctrine of absolute liability as set out in
the case of Rylands v. Fletcher 7 was thoroughly weakened into a law of
exceptions, 4 rendering the application of this concept impossible.
For
instance, in 1965, the Indian Supreme Court, while elaborating on the phrase of
"extra-ordinary use," held that in a country such as India where agriculture is
a major industry and where infrastructure and support systems are necessary for
agricultural and industrial development, it would be wrong to apply the rule of
strict liability for an accident unless negligence is proven.' There was a long
history in India where courts repeatedly refused to apply the strict liability rule
and instead preferred to impose liability under a negligence theoryA°
However, this practice was overruled in 1987 by the Supreme Court, in M. C.
Mehta v. Union of India,"' which held:

[A]n enterprise which is engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous
industry . . . owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the
community to insure that no harm results to anyone .... [A]nd if any
harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise must be
absolutely liable to compensate for such harm ....I
Although this change may appear as a step forward, it did not come as a result
of the court becoming more concerned or humane, but as a result of global
scrutiny of Indian laws. Until this case, Indian courts were willing participants
in the bureaucratic mentality that traditionally denied the rights of victims3
based on the pretext that hazardous activity is necessary to sustain the
development of the country. This pretext is decidedly a violation of human

47. (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
48. Exceptions such as contributory negligence, consent, and statutory activities are discussed
in the following cases respectively: Manor v. Ball, [1900] 16 TLR 239; Narayananv. TravancoreCodin, 1956 A.I.R. 639 (S.C.); Madras Ry. Co. v. Zemindar of Carvatenagarum, 1 I. App. 364
(1874).
49. Punjab v. Modem Cultivators, 1965 A.I.R. 17 (S.C.). In this case, Chief Justice Sinha
criticized the old English concept of "king can do no wrong" and said that there was no reason for
maintaining this feudal concept in India when it has been abolished by statutes in England. Id.
50. Ram Lal v. Lil Dhary, 3 Indian L.R. 776 (Cal. 1877); Shayad Ali v. Shyam Pratap, 41
Indian Cas. 382 (Pat. 1917); Mahindra Nath v. Mathura Das, 1946 A.I.R. 175 (Cal. 1946).
51. (1987) 1 S.C.C. 395-420, cited in Charan La Sahu v. Union of India, Judgment of the
Supreme Court of India, Writ petition No. 268 (1989) (Singh, J., dissenting, at 5); VALANT
VICTIMS, supra note 10, at 617.
52. VALANT VICTIMS, supra note 10, at 618.
53. No effort was ever made to improve safety features of dangerous technology. The
bureaucrats insist that they know what is best for the country in terms of importing new or efficient
technology. This attitude is decidedly the reason behind the government's inaction. In the case of
Bhopal, UCIL was instructed by the government to use domestic consultants for detailed designing
of the plant in question. VAUANT VICTIMS, supra note 10, at 39, 202.
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rights and reflects sheer contempt for the poor. This case is only a beginning,
for there is still much more to accomplish. This is an example of a defective
democratic process where the executive branch overwhelmingly dominates every
policymaking aspect of governance. Politicians' inexperience makes them too
heavily dependent on traditional governmental agencies. Quite frequently,
lawmakers are overpowered by bureaucracy and decide the fate of the masses
without ever realizing that, as public servants, it is their duty to protect the
public's interest. This disturbing attitude finds its way into the national policy
and laws in a very subtle manner.
Another Draconian law that continues to be a part of Indian case law,
primarily due to bureaucratic and political ineptitude, is the law that protects the
government and its employees from all tortious liability. ' In 1962, this law
was modified by the India Supreme Court in the Vidhyawati case, which held
that the "state was liable for damages occasioned by the negligence of its
servants... if the negligence was such as would render an ordinary employer
liable."" However, this progressive development did not last long. In 1965,
the Supreme Court reversed itself, holding that the "state was not liable for the
tortious acts of its servants if the acts were referable to the exercise of the
sovereign powers."'
After this description of substantive laws, it is easier to understand why the
Bhopal case was filed in the U.S. In addition to the Indian courts' tradition of
protecting the government, its policies, and its bureaucratic mentality at the
expense of the victims, those responsible for deciding where to file the cases
were weary of the resurgence of judicial activism on the pretext of Bhopal.57
The cases were replete with information showing that the laws were either not
enforced or completely ignored. Proper execution and enforcement of these
laws could have averted such a catastrophe.'S

54. RATANLA. RANCHHODDAS & DHIRAJLALTHAKORE, THE LAW OF TORTS 25 (1973); Union
of India v. F. Gian Chand Kasturi Lal, 56 INDIAN L.R. 68 (1954).
55. 2 H.M. SamvAi, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1794-95 (3d ed. 1984); Rajasthan v. Mgt.
Vidhyawati, 1962 S.C.R. (Supp. 2).
56. SEERVAi, supra note 55, at 1975; Kasturilal v. Uttar Pradesh, 1965 A.S.C. 1039 (S.C.).
57. While bureaucratic hierarchy and governmental institutions are protected from civil
liability, they are not protected from criminal liability in India. See Ratlam Municipality v.
Vardhichand, 1980 CRI. LJ. 1075-77; VALIANT VIcTims, supra note 10, at 639.
58. Robert Reinhold, Disasterin Bhopal: Where Does the Blame Lie?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
1985, at 8. The Bhopal development plan, which had the force of law, was issued on Aug. 25,
1975. The plan required that the obvious industries, including the Carbide plant, be relocated to
a new industrial zone 15 miles away to save the population from the harmful effects of such
industries. Evidently the plan was not followed despite a 1975 order of the commissioner and
director of town and country p!anning. It is important to note that the license to manufacture the
pesticides was issued two months alter the plan was announced. The latest disclosures indicate that
only two months before the accident, slum dwellers were given permanent property rights all around
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This is a typical scenario of the common law principles of India." Almost
all former colonies of Britain inherited this body of substantive law along with
the bureaucratic machinery traditionally designed to rule the subjects, not the
free citizens, with high-handed bureaucratic control.'
The fact that all the
former colonies have emerged as free nations in the last five decades does not
necessarily indicate that they have matured to practice democracy by developing
and balancing public participation and competence. 6 How far these newly
born democracies follow salus populi' is questionable. The degree to which
any country follows the values attached to salus popul' varies depending on
the combination of the maturity of its political institutions, the degree of literacy,
the economic conditions, and its developmental level.
Under these conditions, Bhopal victims sought redress in a U.S. court along
with the Indian government, which passed special legislation to empower itself
to represent the victims." The final settlement could not have been reached
without the help of U.S. law and U.S. courts. The Indian government overcame
the weaknesses of its own law, primarily the difficulty in reaching the parent
company and the absence of strict liability, by using American substantive and
procedural law. The very fact that Judge Kennon helped the government and
victims secure jurisdiction over the parent company was a victory. The
American procedural law of discovery was also helpful.'
Thus, the final
outcome of the case was the product of two countries' laws and legal systems.

the plant. Id. Such permission, if given, was in violation of many state and federal laws. See
Majupuria, supra note 2, at 30.
59. In addition to the improper location of the plant, the majority of the victims resided on the
property, in violation of several local laws, which legally amounted to contributory negligence on
the part of the victims as well as the state government. See generally SURESH JAIN & VIMLA JAIN,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS IN INDIA (1985) (listing the following statutes: M.P. Regulation of Land
Act, 1948, at 166; M.P. Municipal Corporations Act 1956, §§ 246, 248A; M.P. Local Acts
1919-1970, 2d. ed., vol. LII, 399).
60. See generally Sudhir Chopra, A Review of the Indian Legal and Administradve System in
the Context of Bhopal Disaster: What Is Wrong and What to Do?, 10 AIJGARH L.J. 83 (1990)
[hereinafter Chopra, A Review]; Sudhir Chopra, La Catastrofe De Bhopal El Sistema JuridicoAdministrativo de la India: Que Esta Mal y Hay Que Hacer?, 5 AMBIENTE Y RECURSOS
NATURALES 49 (1989).
61. For a detailed discussion of the principles of participation and competence, see generally
DENNIsTHOMPSON, JOHN STUART MILL AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1976); JOHN STUART

MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (3d ed. 1865).
62. The welfare of the people.
63. The concept of sahsapopulihas been derived from Cicero's (DeFinibus, ii-105) saluspopuli
suprema est lex, the good of the people is chief law. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 151
(3d ed. 1979).
64. In 1985, the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of claims) Act was passed. MASS
DISASTERS, supra note 10, at 11-16.
65. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aif'd.,
809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss1/3

Chopra: Multinational Corporations in the Aftermath of Bhopal: The Need f

1994]

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

251

At last, the victims were comforted by the answer. Of course, the speed with
which this process will attain its objective now fully rests on the politicians of
66
the Central and State Governments.
The purpose of the Indian law-bashing in this Article is not to undermine
the significant role that the Indian Supreme Court and the legal system have
played in delivering justice to the victims. The Supreme Court, in particular,
has shown vision and innovation in handling complex and, at times, politically
controversial matters. Yet, the problem lies with the system inherited from the
British. After all, the system was not structured to run a free society but was
instead designed to govern a colony. An occasional problem in the delivery of
social justice is, that while courts can be bold, innovative, and visionary, they
can also fail to divorce themselves from the fundamental principles of law that
govern their own thought processes. This situation is clearly demonstrated by
the response of Indian substantive law on strict liability of the parent company
or of the government. The judicial process, which has at times demonstrated
signs of judicial activism and innovation,' failed, until recently, to notice and
incorporate the rapid changes of industrial development and hazardous activity
associated with sophisticated technology. The Bhopal incident was a shock that
resulted in a fairly speedy response from both the legislative and judicial
institutions. It is a step forward; yet, much work remains to be done to undo
the damage caused by the typical bureaucratic mentality in the Third World.68
In a divided world, there will be divided law. What divides the world
divides the law as well-socio-economic conditions, maturity of the political and
legal institutions, and the general development level.'
Yet, the world
community is responsible for attempting to reduce this gap. Furthermore,
wherever possible, super-expensive litigation, such as in the Bhopal case, must
be avoided by establishing more creative methods of dispute settlement for
similar situations, even if that requires building new international institutions to
bring harmony to an otherwise fragmented world order. International law is
sought to resolve conflicts between sovereign states, to bring order to a
disorderly state of affairs.
Despite political and ideological constraints,
international legal thinking is often demonstrated through progressive ideas of
new, bold institutions capable of delivering the goods they are asked to deliver.
The question then is: Why not seek a bold and imaginative response to avoid

66. Upendra Baxi, Introduction to VALIANT VICTIMS, supra note 10, at i-iii.
67. See generally Ratlam Municipality v. Vardhichand, CRi. L.J. 1079-77 (1980).
68. Chopra, A Review, supra note 60, at 92-95.
69. RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 6 (1964). See generally Oliver J. Lissitzyn, InternationalLaw in a Divided Worid, 542
INT'L CONCILIATION (Mar. 1963); Stanley Hoffman, InternationalSystems and InternaionalLaw,
14 WoRLD POL. 205 (1961).
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future Bhopals and Sevesos?
B. Seveso, Chernobyl, and Basel
The incident in Seveso had many similarities to the one in Bhopal.
However, unlike Bhopal, Seveso involved two developed countries. The
involvement of two developed countries supports the proposition that the
problem is virtually universal. That is to say, a TNC operating in another
country, whether developed or undeveloped, should have the same responsibility
as if it were operating in its home country. Today, scores of corporations,
particularly governmental corporations from China and India, are engaging in
private and public undertakings in dozens of African and other Asian countries
to help less-developed countries with modem technology. This transfer of
technology enhances development and generates employment. Nevertheless,
such a transfer of technology from one developing country to another is not
necessarily safe, clean, and responsive to contemporary ecological concerns.
The Seveso incident was resolved through settlements reached between the
subsidiary company and the Italian government without resorting to extensive
and expensive litigation. There was no elaborate discussion of what law should
be applied because the subsidiary was the responsible party and could be reached
for the satisfaction of any or all claims. The subsidiary of a developed country
received support from the laws of a developed country and was able to
collaborate with the parent company to satisfy adjudicated or negotiated claims.
Perhaps the Seveso incident did not raise the issue of these accidents to the level
of attracting global attention because the claims were settled easily. This
situation was very different from Bhopal.
The modem TNCs have been operating for nearly two centuries. They
began to expand their business in newly colonized countries with the advent of
European powers. The intensity with which they operate today and the extent
to which the world economy has become dependent on them for their global
network of business activities are relatively new phenomena of the twentieth
century. But for the TNCs, there is no hope for progress in under-developed
countries. An acute sense of interdependence exists here: the developing
countries need TNCs to help alleviate the miseries of poverty, while the
corporations need new markets for the sustained growth of their business
activity. In the post-war years, international energies were primarily spent
addressing the political aftermath of the war; thus, the issue of global
interdependence hardly received adequate attention.
Also, political and
ideological differences were strong impediments to building bold global
institutions capable of transcending the Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations. In a politically sensitive world, "sovereignty" is the last
expression of freedom from all kinds of dominance, whether political or
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economic, or by giant TNCs.' Must there be adherence to what was relevant
in the past, or is it possible to evolve into a global society that is more
responsive to contemporary problems and the needs of the future? This question
requires the immediate attention of politicians and legal scholars alike. Now is
the time to move beyond the traditional First World and Third World approach
to a global society where issues of a transnational nature are addressed by the
global community through accommodation and trust.
The corporate liability in the Basel-Sandoz case was best handled through
the law of state responsibility. As discussed earlier, the Sandoz corporation did
agree to satisfy the French claim, as well as other claims by ecological
institutions. It is noteworthy to mention here that cases between the
corporations of developed countries are generally more easily and amicably
settled, though some degree of distrust towards TNCs can be noticed even by
the public in developed countries. The law of state responsibility, as applied in
the Basel case, was sufficient to provide an adequate remedy."' No involvement of TNCs existed in the Basel situation. The issue was the settlement
between the bordering or affected states due to transboundary pollution. The
most germane rule of international law applicable in such a case was developed
in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, which stated "that it is unlawful for a state to
cause transfrontier pollution which entails serious damage in another state. "I
This rule is applicable in cases where two states are involved. The Chemobyl
accident also illustrates an application of this rule of liability for transfrontier
damages. However, in the cases of Bhopal and Seveso, this rule could not be
invoked because there was no transboundary damage or pollution. In cases
involving transboundary pollution, both states are subject to the custom of
international law that imposes a duty to cooperate, including a duty to provide
information and to consult.' This rule can be relied upon successfully in most
cases similar to Basel or Chernobyl.
In the case of Chernobyl, however, the former Soviet Union refused to
compensate for damages to crops in neighboring countries. There is no clear

70. GEoRO SCHWAgzENBERGER, POwER PoLmIics 121-29 (3d ed. 1964); HANS J.
MORGBNTHAU, PouTncs AMONG NATIONS 98-121,299-312 (4th ed. 1967).
71. Nanda & Bailey, supra note 2, at 182.
72. Trail Smelter (U.S. v Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1941). See also Corfu Channel Case
(U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.CJ. REP. 4.
73. Michael Bothe, InternationalProblems of IndusvialSiting: In BorderAreas and National

Environmental Policies, in TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION AND THE ROLE OF THE STATES 79-97
(1981). See also G.E. Donascimento & E. Silva, Pending Problems on InternationalLaw of the
Environment, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTErNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENvmRONMENT 217 (Ren-Jean
Dupuy ed., 1985); Ganther Handl, National Uses of Transboundary Air Resources: The
InternationalEntiement Issue Reconsidered, 26 NAT. RESOURcES J. 405, 412-13 (1986).
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alternative when a responsible state refuses to satisfy its obligations. 74 The
history of the state responsibility rules is indicative of the problems faced during
four and a half decades of negotiations. Professor Allott's description of the
work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on state responsibility provides
a vivid picture as to why it does not seem to work:
Garcia Amador's first report was ... an extraordinary document
. . . . Individuals would be [the] subject of law entitled to pursue
claims in their own right, breach of which would give rise to the
international responsibility.
It is not difficult to imagine the dismay with which many
members of the Commission greeted the report... [M]ember governments set about bringing the reporter back into line . . . . In
subsequent reports of the Commission life was gradually drained out
75
of the topic.
Indeed, there are many aspects of state responsibility that are settled,
including when and under what circumstances a set of rules should be invoked.
Professor Allott's assessment states that the reason behind the failure at the ILC
lies in the bureaucratization of the international society that projects, in addition
to the influence of a certain social group, a dominance of a certain mentality.
Professor Allot further says:
[It is the] bureaucratic spirit which seeks to get the job done with the
minimum of spiritual commitment and the maximum of personnel
security. It is the spirit of the quiet life rather than the good life,
seeking to gain an accumulation of minor tactical success in relation
to one's professional equals rather than to make original and energetic
contributions to the general interest of society.76

74. Linda A. Malone, The Chemobyl Accident: A Case Study in InternationalLaw Regulating
State Responsibilityfor TransboundaryNuclear Pollution, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 203, 207 n.43
(1987).
75. Phillip Allott, State Responsibilityand the Unmaking ofinternationalLaw, 29 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 1, 4-5 (1988). For a detailed discussion of the topic, see generally WILLIAM BISHOP, JR.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 626-737 (1962); 0.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 381-425
(1979); C.W. Jenks, LiabilityforUltra HazardousActivitiesin InternationalLaw, 117 RECUEIL DES
CoURS 99, 105-200 (1966); Daniel S. Magraw, The InternationalLaw Commission's Study of
InternationalLiabilityfor NonprohibitedActs as It Relates to Developing States, 61 WASH. L. REV.
1041 (1986); Grinther Handl, State Liabilityfor Accidental TransnationalEnvironmental Damage
by Private Persons, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1980).
76. Allott, supra note 75, at 9-10.
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C. Lessons from the Bhopal & Seveso Accidents
From the brief discussion of the factual settings of the four accidents
discussed earlier, it is clear that the Chernobyl and Sandoz accidents, though
ecologically damaging, are in a different category.
In these two cases,
international law of state responsibility could be, and was, effectively invoked.
However, Bhopal and Seveso raised entirely different issues about how to
effectively regulate, control, and mitigate the effects of an industrial disaster.
In the case of Seveso, the subsidiary of a foreign parent company was willing
to settle the case by paying damages. In the case of Bhopal, the attack initially
focused on the foreign parent corporation to find fault with, and lay claim on,
a TNC. This situation highlights the problems faced by developing countries
that frequently import hazardous substances and technology for much needed
developmental projects.
The Bhopal and Seveso incidents raised a number of issues that need further
investigation: how to regulate and subject TNCs operating in foreign countries
to a definite regulatory regime; how to establish and enforce international
standards on the corporations involved in the export and import of hazardous
substances and technology to prevent such accidents in developing countries; and
what kind of dispute settlement mechanisms should be developed to find just
compensation to redress the damage caused to human victims, state economies,
and global ecology. Also, why not inject the sense of a fair social system7
and environmental justices into an international setting? Generally, these

77. Allot writes,
More than any other kind of lawyer, international lawyers have a universalizing
function. The rule which they perceive in one situation must be capable of conforming
with a hypothetical rule for all situations. Customary international law has been a
system of universalizing in Rawlsian mode-universalized self interest. Such a concept
of justice is an inversion of another concept of justice-particular justice as the
particularization of universal justice-but at least it is universalizing in tendency.
Allot, supra note 75, at 24. See generally John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164
(1958); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter A THEORY OF JUSTICE].
78. See generally PETER S. WENz, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 310-24 (1988). I do not agree
with Wenz's conception of environmental justice, because it is structured around a very narrow
perception of the environmental quandary. In discussing distributive justice, he completely misses
international tangents of the ecological riddle. Of all of the problems that we face today,
environmental problems are such that they defy national boundaries-spill over into another's
sovereign air, land, water, or into international commons of air and oceans. I wonder how we can
construe a pluralistic theory for international society that is interdependent-in terms of economic,
technological, and environmental issues? It is important to understand and appreciate that nature is
one whole-interdependent-no matter where we go in the world. The main problem is man's
relationship with nature. The only answer lies in a holistic approach where man agrees to live as
part of nature and not as a species present to conquer and abuse nature. For a different example of
the pluralistic approach, see generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE
CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM (1987).
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concepts are referred to in a setting of the sovereign state, yet the relevance of
these fundamental principles of'justice in the context of a just international legal
order is equally important. Perhaps what is required is an attempt to build an
international regulatory regime that takes into account the political and
economical realities of the contemporary world, including the interdependence
of the global economy, the global implications of environmental hazards, the
global reach of the activities of TNCs, and the existence of third world countries
who need assisted development without the additional cost of environmental
damage. The latter half of the twentieth century has seen the disregard of
national boundaries with regard to technology and economics. Recent rapid
integration of the European and South Asian economies strongly indicates that
uniform values, standards, and mechanisms for the control and regulation of
TNCs are needed in an increasingly borderless society to develop and sustain a
relatively risk-free global community that addresses the needs of both developing
and developed countries.
Economic development and the environment have traditionally been at odds
with each other, particularly in third world countries. Robert McNamara,
former President of the World Bank, very aptly observed:
The question is not whether there should be continued growth. There
must be. Nor is the question whether the impact on the environment
must be respected. It has to be. Nor-least of all-is it a question of
whether these considerations are interlocked. They are. The solution
of the dilemma revolves clearly not about whether, but about how.'
The developing countries have different conceptions of the risk associated
with any hazardous activity. It is a right of every state to decide what
constitutes a safe and risk-free activity, what the standard of the health of its
citizens will be, and what level of pollution that it will accept as legal within its
boundaries.' Yet, it is an entirely different situation when such standards of
health, risk, safety, and pollution begin to interact with the well-being of those
beyond its sovereign jurisdiction."' The adverse effect of such lenient

79. Robert McNamara, Address to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Stockholm, Sweden (1972), quoted in Edith Brown-Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and
IntergenerationalEquity, 11 EcoLoGY L.Q. 495, 538 (1984).
80. See GOnther Handl & Robert Lutz, An InernationalPolicy Perspective on the Trade of
HazardousMaterials and Technologies, 30 HARv. INT'L L.J. 351, 355 (1989).
81. See generally Symposium, Multinational Corporationsand Their New Responsibilitiesto
Disclose and Communicate Risk Information, 6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1988). It is now admitted that
in the last 20 years or so, the duty to inform importers of hazardous technology has evolved from
a mere code of conduct to a customary international law. Daniel Partan, The 'Duty to Inform" in
InternationalEnvironmental Law, 6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 43, 43 (1988). See also Harris Gleckman,
Proposed Requirements for Transnational Corporationsto Disclose Information on Product and
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standards is long-term and can affect the resource base for future generations.'
TNCs operating in developing countries involved in hazardous activity pose
exactly the kind of problem that cannot and should not be left to the whims and
understanding of one country alone, whether it be the importing or exporting
nation. More often than not, developing countries importing hazardous
technology or substances, acting in narrow self-interest, attempt to avoid stricter
standards under the pretext of economic development. Is such behavior justified
when it overlooks the effects of pollution and the health and safety of its own
citizens only to achieve economic development? Certainly not. In an activity
that is clearly global or has long-term effects on a nation's population, such an
exercise of sovereign rights must be moderated.'
Some critics even question whether this is truly an exercise of the sovereign
rights of a developing or developed country or, in fact, a bureaucratization of
society at large. Strong resistance by developing countries to accept higher
standards of health, safety, and environmental protection is a vivid illustration
of the bureaucratization of the issues of global concern that, in the long run, are
likely to affect the international community and even future generations.
Professor Allott describes this bureaucratization as one involving "not only the
dominance of a certain social group but also the dominance of a certain
mentality."" Today, we are at the end of a century that has witnessed the
greatest growth of democracy in the history of civilization. This is the time to
transcend conservative nationalistic positions' and embrace a just global order
where all activities crossing the border of a nation state are subject to one
uniform standard. With such an approach in mind, this Article shall examine
the existing international law in general, and then, more specifically, the
international law applicable to TNCs and international environmental law.
Having established that the existing body of law is inadequate, obsolete, and
ineffective, it is possible to develop and analyze what kind of global order and

Process Hazards,6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 89 (1988).
82. See generally Handl & Lutz, supra note 80, at 354; Brown-Weiss, supra note 79, at 495;
see also Stockholm Declaration, U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF/4814/REV. 1 (1972), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1416 (1972).
83. For a different view, see generally Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability
in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1 (1980); PHILLIP I. BLUMBERO, THE
MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW (1993).

84. Allot, supra note 75, at 9.
85. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 70, at 209-12. Schwarzenberger, under the heading
"Limitations and Peculiarities of International Law," discusses the problems associated with
enforcement of international legal norms. Id. at 209. Separately, in three different chapters titled
"International Aristocracy," "International Oligarchy," and "Minor Members of International Cast,"
he addresses the issues that shape the scope and content of the accepted norms of international law.
Id. at 99-139.
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sense of justice is needed to form a base for a global regulatory regime to
prevent and mitigate such disasters.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES-DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT
6

International legal literature is full of guidelines originating both from the
United Nation agencies and regional organizations. In reality, these guidelines
serve no purpose other than to edify their authors. The fact that these are only
guidelines demonstrates that anything more would be unacceptable to one
interest group or the other. Each group is trying to protect either its right to
liberty" (that is, refusing to subject itself to foreign control or any control) or
its right to equality' (that is, seeking economic and technical parity). These
factors are the causes of the nation states' desire to indulge in a power struggle
among the community of nation states.s' The main guidelines for purposes of
this Article can be found in the Stockholm Declaration," the Code of Conduct
for Transnational Corporations,'e the ILO Declaration, 9' and the Rio Summit

86. Douglas M. Johnston, The Foundations of Justice in Intemational Law, in THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 125-29 (Ronald St. John Macdonald et al.
eds., 1978); ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 46 (1958); ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS
ON LIBERTY 164-65 (1969).
87. The principle of equality in international law implies equality of state. According to
Professor Dickinson, there is a lot of confusion between two principles: equality before the law and
an equal capacity for rights and obligations. He writes that the latter is "an ideal toward which the
law should seek to develop." EDWIN D. DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 3-4 (1920). J.L. Brierly writes:
If the theory of equality, therefore, is interpreted to mean that all states have equal rights
in law, it is contradicted by the facts. It is a true theory only if it means that the rights
of one state, whatever they may be, are as much entitled to the protection of law as the
rights of any other, that is to say, if it merely denies that the weakness of a state is any
excuse in law for disregarding its legal rights.
J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 66 (1928).
88. MORGENTHAU, supra note 70, at 36-82. Morgenthau writes that all political phenomenon
can be reduced to three basic types: to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power.
A nation whose foreign policy tends towards keeping power and not towards changing
the distribution of power in its favor pursues a policy of the status quo. A nation whose
foreign policy aims at acquiring more power than it has, through a reversal of existing
power relations-whose foreign policy, in other words, seeks a favorable change in
power status-pursues a policy of imperialism. A nation whose foreign policy seeks to
demonstrate the power it has,. either for the purpose of maintaining or increasing it,
pursues a policy of prestige.
Id. at 36-37. This is a classical approach to international relations. Now, in an era of global
environmentalism-especially in the aftermath of the East-West rivalry-the rules for international
relations are rapidly changing.
89. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
90. See infra note 97 and accompanying text; supra note 5 and accompanyingtext (Programme
of Action).
91. See infra note 100 and accompanying text; supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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and its declarations.92 A careful examination of these recommendations and
principles will show that they contradict each other and that there has been little
progress, if any, between Stockholm and Rio. The tension between the North
and South continues. The only progress is the recognition of new problem
areas, and, once again, the nation states have agreed to disagree on the methods
and means of resolving the new quagmire.
A. Stockholm Declaration
To begin with, Recommendation 103 of the Stockholm Declaration
recommends that governments take the necessary steps to ensure:
(a)

That all countries . . . agree not to invoke environmental

concerns as a pretext for discriminatory trade policies or for reduced
access to markets and recognize further that the burdens of the
environmental policies of the industrialized countries should not be
transferred, either directly or indirectly, to the developing countries.
As a general rule, no country should solve or disregard its
environmental problems at the expense of other countries .....
(e) That all countries agree that uniform environmental standards
should not be expected to be applied universally by all countries with
respect to given industrial process or products except in the cases
where environmental disruption may constitute a concern to other
countries.
Recommendation 106 states:
That Governments of the developing countries consider fully the
new opportunities that may be offered to them to establish industries
and/or expand existing industries in which they may have comparative
advantages because of environmental considerations, and that special
care be taken to apply the appropriate international standards on
environment in order to avoid the creation of pollution problems in
developing countries ....
Recommendation 108 states:
It being recognised that it is in the interest of mankind that the
technologies for protecting and improving the environment be

92. See infra notes 105, 108 and accompanying text.
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employed universally.... .3
A glance at the language of these recommendations suggests that the
essence of the problem is a fight between the North and the South. Each party
is seeking to maintain its freedom from foreign interference while agreeing to
protect the environment in principle. Recommendation 103 addresses the NorthSouth conflict and satisfies both by failing to invoke environmental concerns as
a pretext for discriminatory trade policies and by failing to develop policies that
might lead to restrictive practices in the transfer of technology to developing
countries. At the same time, those seeking equality further emphasize that the
same environmental concerns should not be permitted to deny or reduce access
to developed countries since equality is necessary for the developing economies
to sell their products in developed countries. The recommendation further
emphasizes that the burden of environmental policies, such as expansive
pollution control mechanisms and stricter process-safety standards, should not
be transferred along with technology." This means that ecologically damaging
industries should not be relocated to developing countries." This last scenario
appears to be self-contradictory because the objective of equality with developed
economies requires that developing countries strive to achieve the same
standards as are observed in developed countries.
How can the objective of equality be realized when, while seeking the most
advanced of technologies, the very features of advancement are denied as part
of a technology transfer package? This illogical approach has its roots in a
bureaucratic mentality that thrives on minor technical successes rather than
seeking practical solutions. The irony is that a guideline that seems to have
emerged from an expensive diplomatic exercise on an issue of global
significance, in the end, provides everything except a solution. The question of
seeking access to markets amounts to asking for the acceptance of inferior
goods. The very idea of such a position suggests that the inferior should be
accepted as an equal. Inferior and superior can never be equal; the only way
to seek and achieve equality is to compete and ask for fair competition.
Equality does not follow from charity. If third world countries seek equality,
then they must seek partnership on equal footing rather than technical victories
at the negotiating table.

93. Stockholm Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/48/14/REV. 1 (1972), reprinted in 11 INT'L
L. MATERIALS 1416 (1972); see also JAMEs BARROS & DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 303-06 (1974).
94. SeymourJ. Rubin, A PredominantlyCommercialPolicyPerspective,in ENVIRONMENTAND
TRADE, supra note 7, at 3.
95. See generally Ingo Walter, EnvaronmentalyInduced Industnal Relocation to Developing
Countries, in ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE, supra note 7, at 67.
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This is not to suggest that I support the policies of TNCs. There is enough
evidence in the historical literature that multinationals thrive on the idea of
maximization of wealth at minimal cost. The exploitative tactics of multinationals are indeed well documented. Multinationals often adopt strategies and
means devoid of human values because human input is measured in economic
terms rather than by moral and ethical standards."
In addition, nation states agree that uniform standards should not be
universally applied, especially with regard to industrial process and product
safety. Is not this principle a glaring example of the Bhopal scenario? What
was sought as a technology transfer for the Bhopal plant was supposed to be
inferior, in principle. Even though the facts are still in dispute, these types of
guidelines actually misguide the countries that export technology. Perhaps the
tactical victory gained by the bureaucrats of the developing nations was, after
all, a tactical defect, for it failed to protect the public interest. Can there be
accountability for such absurdity? Certainly not. This recommendation is
nothing but a denial of the equality that the Third World is seeking.
Recommendation 106 completely negates the guidelines developed in
Recommendation 103 because it recognizes that opportunities may exist when
developing countries will be offered more sophisticated technology equipped
with environmentally safer features, but that special care shall be taken to refuse
such superior technology. Even though the desire to acquire safer technology
is present, economics prevail when it comes to the actual transfer of technology.
Good intentions are not enough to reach parity. Recommendation 108 firmly
establishes the guideline that recognizes the interest of mankind in supporting the
globalization of ecologically safe technology. Once again, the guideline has
desirable objectives; yet, it is not a binding principle. Furthermore, the earlier
recommendations have already negated its effects.
B. Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations and the ILO Declaration
The Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations emerged from the

96. S.K. Verma, InternationalCode of Conductfor TransnationalCorporations,20 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 20 (1980); WERNER J. FELD, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND U.N. POLITICS 32
(1980). On the issue of the valuation of human-labor in economic terms, see generally ADAM
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 7-25 (Edwin

Cannan ed., 1976) (1776); JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POITICAL ECONOMY. 29-53
(William Ashley ed., 1987) (1848); REv. THOMAS R. MALTHUS, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 85-107 (1820). For a discussion of David Ricardo's theory, see generally ERIC ROLL,
A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 160-63 (5th ed. 1992).
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1974 movement to establish a New International Economic Order.' One main
concern of this discussion is the Resolution on the Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order.' The proposed Code
of Conduct for Transnational Corporations as proposed by the U.N. General
Assembly states the following objectives: 1) the prevention of TNCs' interference in the internal affairs of the host countries and collaboration with racist
regimes; 2) the prohibition of restrictive business practices by TNCs; 3) the
transfer of technology and management skills by TNCs to developing countries
on equitable and favorable terms; 4) the regulation of repatriation of profits by
the TNCs; and 5) the adoption of provisions to promote reinvestment of TNCs'
profits in developing countries."
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy recommends
that TNCs should give priority to local personnel in employment and training,
use technologies which generate employment, provide workers with information
about the firm to allow meaningful negotiations, and work with governments to
promote good labor and employment practices."m
This Article will now examine the recommendations of the Code of
Conduct for Transnational Corporations and the ILO Principles to assess their
goals and achievements in the context of overall progress of the developing
countries. Of course, the biggest problem is that opinions differ regarding how
to accelerate the process of much-needed development to improve conditions in
the developing world. The fundamental position of one side is to maintain
liberty, while the other side seeks equality.
The first principle referred to in the Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations reflects the historical concerns of those seeking to benefit from the
transfer of technology through the TNCs. Interference in internal affairs of host
countries was a common concern. The idea of wanting to discourage the
practice warrants some merit. This guideline favors the approach where giant

97. This movement is articulated in three U.N. Resolutions passed by the General Assembly
in 1974: Declaration on the Establishment of a New InternationalEconomic Order, G.A. Res.
3201, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9556 (1974); ProgrammeofAction on the
Establishmentof a New InternationalEconomic Order,G.A. Res. 3202,29 U.N. GAOR Supp. No.
31, at 5, U.N. Doc. 1/9556 (1974) [hereinafter Programmeof Acton]; and the CharterofEconomic
Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1975).
98. Programme of Action, supra note 97, at 5.
99. Programme of Action, supra note 97, at 728.
100. International Labor Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
MultinationalEnterprisesand Social Policy, ILO Labor Office CH-1211 Geneva 22 (1977); Burns,
supra note 5, at 55; Grosse, supra note 6, at 414, 420.
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TNCs, instead of providing the means for attaining equality, begin influencing
the unstable political cultures and, consequently, the political process. By
exercising influence on the body politic, TNCs place themselves in the position
to dictate terms most beneficial to them, thus depriving the developing host of
any possibility of achieving equality. Such situations have often interfered with
the political liberty of host countries.
The second principle in the Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations requires the prohibition of restrictive business practices. This is
to avoid a monopoly of TNCs, which eventually controls the governmental
decisionmaking process and the consumers' choices in the developing world.
The third principle is the most sound and should have a positive effect on
the overall development process. However, the combined reading of this
provision with Recommendation 106 of the Stockholm Declaration"0 ' and with
the ILO Declaration seeking the use of technologies that generate employment,
demonstrates that the actual transfer of technology which is sought on equitable
and favorable terms turns into a technology that has been altered and stripped
of its most efficient, protective, and safety-related aspects. Thus, the problem
of achieving equality remains. The more one tactical victory is negotiated, the
more is lost because this method fails to reduce the developmental gap. This
gap widens with every scientific breakthrough in the West; instead of moving
in the direction of achieving developmental parity, we move toward disparity.
The fourth principle referred to in the Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations, recommending regulations for repatriation of profits, has a strong
appeal because it results in more capital and technological transfers. Yet
compelling provisions, which severely restrict the repatriation of profit, do not
necessarily mean that new technology will indeed follow. The intended
objective can best be achieved by providing a more flexible and functional
approach which will eliminate the feeling of insecurity and leave the option of
market development open to investors. Regulation of the repatriation of profits,
with a limited objective to study and analyze the patterns and results of profit
movements, is more likely to encourage risk-free investment that will ultimately
lead to accelerated development.
The ILO principle seeking more employment opportunities for local
population has good intentions but reflects a regional attitude. The developing
countries will have to leave the decisions of training and competent employment
to the multinationals if they want to achieve real progress. Much-needed
exposure and attainment of superior skills is thus denied by insisting on local

101. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the Stockholm Declaration).
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employment. An urgent need exists not only for the technology transfer but also
for the proper training of local personnel. Advanced examples of work ethics
can be used to improve the work habits of local people. An opportunity to learn
new ways of thinking and a broader perspective is thus missed.2 While the
principle helps create more jobs, it certainly fails to introduce local people to
better work ethics and professionalism, both of which are needed to compete in
the global market. Again, the effect is self-denial of a learning process, which
is necessary for achieving technological progress and equality. By asking for
technology that generates the maximum number ofjobs, the developing countries
give up efficient methods of production. A technology that is environmentally
responsive is more likely to be one that creates fewer jobs, but is much more
efficient in the quality of production.
C. The Earth Summit, 1992
The Earth Summit was preceded by two meetings: the Tokyo Declaration
on Financing Global Environment and Development and the Kuala Lumpur
Declaration. At the Tokyo meeting, developed countries emphasized the "need
to re-evaluate the thinking which underlies our present society. " °"3 They
further emphasized that new principles of environmental ethics needed to be
established.'
All that developing countries would have liked to have heard
was included in this declaration except for the specifics concerning the transfer
of technology. There were commitments for financial assistance and recognition
of the need to pass on environmentally safe and sound technology. However,
at the Kuala Lumpur meeting, developing countries repeated their positions from
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration. They stated:
[W]e call on the developed countries to ensure without further delay
a balanced, meaningful, and satisfactory conclusion of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. We further emphasize that

102. It is a well-known fact that the key to Japanese industrial success ties in their superior
work ethic, which has given them a decided advantage over their industrial competitors.
Both
Germany and the United States are not only studying the Japanese work ethic, but are also trying
to adopt it. One of the factors that is now well recognized in the West is that workers' participation
in product development strategy, production policy, environmental standards, and international
market demands is crucial to gain a competitive advantage. Unless developing countries are willing
to import such other measures as are now necessary to effectively compete in the global market, they
are unlikely to succeed in their objective of achieving parity with developed countries.
103. Eminent Persons Meeting on Financing Global Environment and Development, Tokyo,
April 15-17, 1992, reprinted in Tokyo Declaration on Financing Global Environment and
Development, 22.4 ENvrL. POL'Y & L. 265 (August 1992).
104. See remarks made by Professors Richard Falk, Christopher Stone, and Sudhir Chopra, in
A Round Table Discussion: Nature Conservazion inthe Face of Atmospheric Degradation,83 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 154-55 (1989) (emphasizing the need to create new environmental ethics that
will alter our habits of consumption to a more ecologically responsible level).
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developed countries should not attempt to impose unilateral restrictions
on international trade, in particular, on natural resource-based and
other related products on environmental grounds."°
On the question of transfer of technology, the developing countries stressed the
need for "assured access to and transfer of environmentally sound technology
on preferential and concessional terms to developing countries, taking into
consideration that Intellectual Property Rights should not hinder the transfer of
environmentally sound technology.""
These were the background meetings
that set the stage for the Rio Summit.
The Summit dealt with the issues of transferring environmentally sound
technology, cooperation, and capacity building under Chapter 34 of Agenda
21.' 07 Much of what was said in the two prior declarations was agreed to and
constituted the substance of Chapter 34. However, one of the thorniest issues
that remained unresolved was the expression "transfer of technology." This
term was not acceptable to developed countries, in particular the United States,
who preferred the term "technological cooperation." Other differences centered
upon intellectual property rights and the possible creation of a code of conduct
for the transfer of technology.
Developing countries won the right to
compulsory acquisition of intellectual property rights to technologies owned by
companies operating within their countries. However, such rights were to be
acquired in accordance with the current and evolving international law, along
with the rules negotiated at the Uruguay Round of the GAT talks. Consideration of the question of an international code of conduct on technology transfer
has differed at the ongoing talks at the UNCTAD. 0" On one hand, this
chapter asks for environmentally safe technologies that "include know-how,
procedures, goods and services, and equipment as well as organisational and
managerial procedures." 9 On the other hand, it states that developing
countries believe that "such technologies should be compatible with nationally
determined socio-economic, cultural, and environmental priorities." 1

105. Second Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on Environment and
Development, Kuala Lumpur, April 26-29, 1992, reprinted in 22.4 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 266, 4
(August 1992).
106. Id. at 267, 14.
107. Id. at 219.
108. Agenda Item 21, was a 800-plus-page report that was prepared by the Preparatory
Commission to UNCED under the mandate of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution passed in
1989. See A/Conf. 151/4, Part I, and Corr.1, Part H and Corr. 1, Part MII,and Part IV and Corr.
1, reprinted in Rio Conference on Environment and Development, 22.4 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 204-25
(August 1992).
109. Environmentally Sound Technology, 22.4 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 294 (August 1992).
110. Id.
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It is clear that while developing countries are anxious to acquire the stateof-the-art, environmentally safe and sound technology, along with everything
that accompanies it, they fail to recognize that there is no state-of-the-art
technology that is designed for and compatible with nationally determined
socio-economic and cultural priorities. Developed countries do not possess
magic that will convert the technology to these useless demands. There is either
state-of-the-art technology that is environmentally sound and safe because it has
been designed for that purpose through heavy investment in research and
development, or there is out-dated technology that is not quite environmentally
safe. Ideally, there would be an ability to convert state-of-the-art technology
into the type of technology that developing countries desire. Asking that such
technologies also adapt to nationally determined environmental priorities results
in stripped-down technology that will no longer be state-of-the-art. What is
necessary is state-of-the-art technology that will protect the environment from
further degradation. The idea is to keep cleaner areas less polluted. There is
only one way to development, and that is to stop converting the technologies to
suit developing countries. Developing countries have to understand that such
conditions encourage TNCs to move outdated plants and technologies to the
Third World. On the contrary, if the developing countries insisted on acquiring
the same technology that exists in developed countries, they would then at least
be assured of less pollution and improvement of their workforce to the highest
levels that are compatible with developed nations.
The grand tactical victory won by developing countries for intellectual
property rights will actually result in a total long-term loss. Such demands will
discourage TNCs from further technology transfers that are likely to result in a
competitive disadvantage in the international market. It is very important to
recognize that an open-door policy that allows TNCs to freely compete in the
global market will encourage them to transfer the best technology to the needy
regions of the world. All of these tactical victories are not going to bring
progress to developing countries at the rate necessary for them to alleviate
poverty and environmental problems. Only open-market and open-door policies
will lead to the creation of a truly global market. The closed-door policies that
have been in place for the better part of this century have shown that developing
countries remain underdeveloped.
The solution lies not in these tactical victories, but rather in the realization
that we live in an increasingly interdependent world. No fully self-sufficient
country exists. Furthermore, China, India, and the former Soviet Union have
convincingly demonstrated the impossibility of complete self-reliance.
Developing countries must recognize that developed countries have an enormous
advantage in terms of technology and scientific knowledge; this gives them an
edge in terms of further scientific and technological breakthroughs.
If
developing countries keep their doors closed, they will remain underdeveloped
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and will never reach a satisfactory level of development.
However, the idea is not that developing countries should surrender
altogether to the whims and desires of developed countries or their TNCs. A
code of conduct for technology transfers will be negotiated at UNTAD, and
those rules on technology transfer already negotiated at GATT will be further
revised. Fragmentation of this international bureaucracy needs to be addressed.
Even the Rio Summit is a clear example of the duplicity of bureaucratic
bungling where persons dissatisfied with UNEP tried to create a parallel
institution in the form of UNCED. Of what value are 800 pages of agenda
items, full of repetitive and self-contradicting provisions, if in the end they will
transfer a watered-down version of state-of-the-art technology? It will be a
waste of public funds to argue over the same principles ten years after the grand
event at Rio. Instead, the aspirations of the poor and the rich need to be
considered, and our priorities need to be examined in realistic terms. An
international framework similar to domestic corporate law is needed to cover
every aspect of global trading.
Besides the declarations and principles discussed here, there are many more
U.N. Resolutions and regional and international guidelines that, in essence,
promote the same ideals.'
However, the disjointed nature of the body of soft
laws leads to no positive gains. The uncontrolled situation of TNCs remains a
challenge for those aspiring to bring some uniformity to international trade. The
development of principles or codes does not mean that they will be accepted in
practice or that such conflicting laws will bridge the gap or reduce disparities
in the Third World. Mere acceptance in principle is the current state of
transnational business.
V. AN APPRAISAL

The first goal of this Article was to analyze the factual setting of the Bhopal
accident and other accidents in the context of traditional laws. The second was
to assess the responsiveness of laws, institutions, policies, and guidelines that
were invoked to mitigate the suffering of victims. The third goal was to

111. See generally Symposium, Environmental Development, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. 715
(1988); Stephen McCaffrey, The Work ofInternationalLaw Commission Relating to Transfrontier
Environmental Harm, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. 715 (1988); Maureen A. Bent, Note, Exporting
HazardousIndustries:Should American StandardsApply, 20 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. 777 (1988); Harry
Otway, Risk Communication and Policy in the European Communities: Background, Status and
Trends, 6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 5 (1988); Michael Baram, Risk CommunicationLaw and Implementation
Issues in the United States and the European Communiy, 6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 21 (1988); Michael
Will, Liability to Warn in the EuropeanCommunity, 6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 125 (1988). See also OECD
Conference on Accidents Involving Hazardous Substances, HazardousInstallations in Developing
Countries, OECD Doc. ENVICONFIACCI88.4 (1987).
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examine the international codes, conventions, and declarations as are relevant
in the scheme of this inquiry. This process was to help identify the problem
areas and hopefully to demonstrate that the existing framework of both national
and international law thoroughly lacks the ability to address the issues that arise
out of North-South trade, North-North ventures, and the problems within
developing countries (South-South trade-the trade between less developed
countries and least developed countries). It is this last factor that has remained
unaddressed in most scholarly writings and should be a cause of greater concern.
Neither the behavior of multinationals nor the solutions offered by the legal
systems of the nation states sufficiently and comprehensively address the
objectives that they have set for themselves-the safe, speedy, and ecologically
sound progress of less developed societies. While the progress is impressive for
identifying the issues and objectives, it is far from impressive in practice. We
have seen that problems such as Chernobyl and Sandoz are best left to affected
states for speedy dispute resolution.
Nonetheless, the case of Bhopal
encountered a different problem that could not be resolved with the traditional
law of state responsibility. Of course, the issues of immediate concern to
victims will be resolved sooner or later. Still unresolved is the question of how
to avoid repetition of the Bhopal incident in developing countries and the Seveso
incident in developed countries. Bhopal clearly demonstrates the North-South
problems with hazardous technology transfers, along with the issue of control
over TNCs. Seveso primarily reflects the concern over the irresponsibility of
TNCs, as well as the inept attitude of local law enforcement agencies. The two
cases jointly indicate that the problems do not reside with exporters or importers
alone, but with both. How to address the problem depends upon the objectives.
If the goal is to satisfy the aspirations of mankind and to move in the direction
of providing basic equality, then these aspirations must first be ascertained in
clear terms. Only then can new institutions be built to achieve these goals.
The aspirations of the global society can be reduced to one single concept:
"just global order." This not only seeks to achieve global justice in theory, but
strives to create institutions that can deliver global justice in practice. If a just
order for the world community is sought, one where the goal is near parity of
global societies by reducing developmental, economic, and political disparities,
then an optimum level of order for global financial interactions that include all
aspects of global trade must be formulated. The existing framework regulating
the transfer of hazardous technology to developing countries is a failure of an
order and, therefore, amounts to an unjust order. Professor Falk suggests that
"the quest of world order, its claim of possibility, always rests on challenging
the established wisdom and authority of the day, shattering the realist consensus
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of its particular day."" 2 Before examining alternative remedies, it is essential
to fully explore and understand the causes for the failure of the existing system.
Such examination must start with problems as perceived in psychological terms
and then explore the historical foundations of the international legal order.
However, such examination must be carried out with a clear understanding of
the historical process that has led to confusion in understanding world order.
A.

The Psychology of the Diplomatic Elite

For a full understanding of the psychology that pervades and dictates the
international negotiations and the law-maling process, a look behind the
negotiating process is needed, deep into the learning, education, thinking, and
motives of bureaucrats who possess the power to seek equality and freedom.
Professor Falk writes that "[t]he accelerating velocity of history itself and our
improved awareness of it" in modern times, "through a stream of
communications actually has the principal effect of denying a sustaining contact
with our past, even with our recent past. ""s He further says that our
"preoccupation... with the future can be substituted for learning or relearning
how to remember.""4 In his opinion, this is a very "important ingredient of
an approach to the future, especially for lawyers who are often in a different and
uncreative way tied to the past as a consequence of their veneration of
precedent."'
He suggests that "one needs to be extremely attentive to what
can be learned from the past but not to insist on some kind of mechanical
subservience to that which the past imposes on an evolving present. ""6
Professors Macdonald, Johnston, and Morris draw our attention to yet
another aspect of the perceptions of the governing elite. They observe that "the
easiest and least controversial" perspective is "the relevance of the perceptions
of the governing elite to any inquiry into the making of government
policies.""" In their opinion, "the making of economic policies within a
nation state," to some degree, "is discolored by the way in which the governing
elite perceives the goals of human development and the alternative methods of

112. RicHAR FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAw 74-75 (1989) [hereinafter FALK,
ROVITALU7NOJ; Richard Falk, The Questfor World Order: The Legacy of Optimism Re-Examined,
9 DALHousiE L.J. 132-48 (1984).
113. FALK, REVrTAI.NO, supra note 112, at 58, reprimedfrom Richard Falk, Future of
InternationalLaw, 75 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PRoc. 9 (1981).
114. Id. at 59.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Ronald St. John Macdonald et al., InternationalLaw of Human Welfare: Concept,
Eperience, and Priorities,in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POUCY OF HUMAN WEILFARE, supra
note 86, at 5.
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ameliorating human welfare."""
Professor Allot describes the hopelessness of the situation in these words:
"The great increase in overall energy of public life within nation states in the
twentieth century has been matched by a dramatic rise in the energy of the
public life of international society.""' As to the causes of the rise of such
international activity, he suggests "[i ] ncreases in population, [and] increases in
Of the specialists, he writes
the volume of international transactions ... .
that they include "the politicians, the diplomats, and the national and
international civil servants."' 2' He then observes that the "increase in the
power of these professionals parallels that of their opposite numbers in national
public life."' "
However, the "difference is that there has not been a
corresponding increase either in democratic accountability of such people to
citizens whose lives they affect or in the participation of the nonprofessionals in
the international decision making process. " "' Ironically, he observes that, in
the end, "[d]iplomacy is still a relatively closed world, esoteric and
remote. "124

The one common cry that runs through these three passages referred to here
is that the public, the masses, and humanity suffer because the fate of human
civilization and the planet Earth has been left in the hands of bureaucrats, the
representatives of Vattalism. These people are trained to think in the manner
that Professor Falk describes as "mechanical subservience" to the past that holds
them from progressing further. Professors Macdonald, Johnston, and Morris
blame the governing elite for its discolored perception of the goals of human
development. Professor Allot very convincingly questions the rising authority
of the bureaucrats because, despite their enormous capacity to influence the fate
of millions, they have no moral accountability to the masses who they seem to
represent. An irony exists here: at the end of the twentieth century, we have
failed to evolve into the system that many thinkers had envisioned after the
Second World War, a globally responsible system capable of delivering justice
to mankind, maintaining peace, and uplifting the downtrodden to a respectable
standard of living."z The question is whether these so-called "bureaucratic

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Allon, supra note 75, at 9.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

124. Id.
125.

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, A CONSTITUTION FOR THE

WORLD 23-24 (1965). This constitution was originally prepared and published in 1947. Id. at 24.
It was prepared by a committee chaired by Professor Robert Hutchins. Id. at 7. See also Douglas
M. Johnston, The Foundationsof Justice in InternationalLaw, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
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elites" are really the elite. Are they not professing a kind of sectarian
patriotism, authoritarianism, Machiavellianism of strict observance, or
imperialist mysticism? If history is any evidence, such ideologies have been
encountered and have, in the final analysis, been buried. This is the kind of
thinking that has caused innumerable sufferings to mankind since antiquity. Of
course, these attitudes give credence to those who had analyzed the human
destiny from a biological perspective.
Bergson wrote:
One of the results of our analysis has been to draw a sharp distinction,
in the sphere of society, between the closed and the open... [T]he
open society is the society which is deemed in principle to embrace all
humanity. . . . [T]he closed society is that whose members hold
together, caring nothing for the rest of humanity, on the alert for
attacks or defense, bound, in fact, to a perpetual readiness for battle.
Such is human society fresh from the hands of nature. Man was made
for this society, as the ant made for the ant heap.'"
Yet, Bergson himself believed in one world."n
It is necessary for the development of mankind that our society be opened.
Open, in this context, means that people should not stop caring for each other
regardless of the color of skin, national boundary, language, religion, or
economic prosperity. Our behavior ought to demonstrate that we are different
from ants, who live a closed life. Without the trust of each other or an interest
in the global society, we are not likely to progress with our negotiations. Given
the kind of thinking that controls the substance of the international negotiating
processes, it is important to question the psychology of our representatives, who
are in many ways more important than our elected officials. These people
determine the fate of mankind in many ways, and their unaccountability gives
them free rein over their fate. It is here that a balance between popular
representation and competence is needed. Indeed, competence is necessary to
deal with complex social and economic problems; yet, a complete lack of
understanding about popular aspirations and sentiments is causing our negotiators
to act in a manner that is detrimental to the interests of mankind and the society
of nations.

POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE, supra note 86, at 111.
126. HENRI BERGSON, THE Two SOURCES OF MORALITY AND RELIGION 255 (R. Ashley Audra
& Claudesley Brereton trans., 1935), quoted in G.A. BORGESE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE WORLD

REPUBLIC 34 (1953).
127.

BORGESE, supra note 126, at 35.
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B. Assigning the Blame
There are two distinct elements in the inquiry to assign moral accountability
for accidents."
First, it must be determined whether the accident itself was
voluntary. Second, the legal regimes, both domestic and international, that
allowed such accidents to occur must be evaluated. Since blame is assigned only
in the case of voluntary acts, all factors need to be analyzed. If the act or
combination of acts causing the accident was involuntary, then we may find
ourselves ready to condone or perhaps express pity. Since the premise of the
inquiry is to find ways to prevent such accidents in the future, the limits of
voluntary and involuntary acts must be determined in the factual sense.
Actions are generally considered involuntary when they are the result of
ignorance or are performed under compulsion. Two theories exist concerning
the Bhopal accident. The first is advanced by Union Carbide USA and raises
allegations of sabotage. The second, which formed the basis of the plaintiffs'
claim, tries to assign blame on the company for negligence in design and
management. Indeed, the claim of sabotage is plausible. However, the vast
body of factual information indicates that there were also design errors and
operational mistakes. If a case of sabotage was certain, then perhaps it would
have been simple to assign blame. The immense amount of information that
came out of the initial investigation has shown that there were many areas
lacking adequacy and effectiveness. Most of these areas point in the direction
of a confusing jungle of regulatory regime that had no other objective than to
control, dominate, and dictate every conceivable aspect of corporate activity.
Whether this act was voluntary depends on how the facts and the doctrinal side
of the government's desire to regulate corporate activity are examined. More
often than not, excessive regulation leads to confusion, leaving lawyers as the
only beneficiaries of the complications. What the government did through its
bureaucrats is the object of the assessment here.
All laws are created for a certain purpose, usually to preserve the social
good. Whether these laws succeed in achieving their objectives becomes
secondary when they begin to do harm in areas other than those for which they
were created. For example, the people of Bhopal were allowed to live in
dangerous proximity to the plant. Is the excessive desire for the government
control which caused the company to develop detail design plans in India or the
desire to develop domestic technology that caused such hazardous accidents to
occur voluntary or involuntary? Perhaps it can be said that this was an
"involuntary" act because there was no clear desire on the part of the lawmakers

128. See generally ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 77-108 (J. Thomson
trans, Penguin Books 1955) (book 3, speaking on moral responsibility).
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of the company to cause such an accident, resulting in the death of thousands.
However, when the proper role of the lawmaking specialists is examined, an
expectation arises that the lawmakers, especially the bureaucratic elite, exhibit
the reasonable degree of competence needed for democracy. Failure of the
bureaucrats to sufficiently foresee the possible consequences may suggest that
the actions were involuntary. But, an act cannot be treated as involuntary when
the bureaucrats were sufficiently warned by the TNCs of the hazardous nature
of the activity.'" It appears more an act of negligent omission on the part of
the bureaucracy, an arm of government that is required to balance between the
ills of representative government and competence. If this analysis is accepted,
the tendency is then toward condoning their incompetence. However, more
consideration must be given to see if it was just an oversight or a desire to
achieve some objective regardless of the cost. In the latter instance, such an act
must be treated as willful, with the full understanding of the possible adverse
consequences. In the Bhopal case, it seems that the government's failure to
relocate the people from the vicinity of the plant, its willingness to sacrifice the
quality of technology for safety, its willingness to allow legal residence in the
vicinity of the plant in defiance of its own laws, and its excessive regulation
denying the parent company its proper role in safe management shows only one
thing, voluntary negligence on the part of the domestic bureaucrats.
Through the international regulation structured by the specialists of
international activity in the codes of conduct, resolutions, and declarations, we
witness another side of the dominance of bureaucratic elites. This side of the
government is indirectly involved in determining the fate of the masses well
beyond the borders of their own states. All tactical victories that are earned on
the negotiating table indicate a certain perception about the value of human life,
a certain mentality about what amounts to the exercise of "freedom" or
"equality," a certain, very selective, adherence to history."30 To say that these
people who normally represent the best of the competents were not familiar with
the likely adverse consequences amounts to questioning their competency. If
indeed they were competent, then the acceptance of the risk in the form of a
watered-down version of hazardous technology amounts to voluntary acceptance
of the hazards and voluntary application of such technology to the detriment of
the poor masses, who suffer as a consequence of such risks.'
This is an
extension of the concept of utility, in reverse order, and well beyond economic

129. Michael P. Walls, Chemical Exports and tMe Age of Consent:

The High Cost of

InternaionalExport Control, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 753, 755 (1987). The impetus for
prior informed consent began with a U.N. General Resolution passed in 1981 that required exchange
of information for "banned hazardous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceutical products.' Id. at 755;
G.A. Res. 37/137, 37 U.N. GAOR (109th plen. mtg.) at 1849, U.N. Doe. A/C.2/38/SR.27 (1982).
130. Johnston, supra note 86, at 120-30.
131. Handl, supra note 21, at 614-22.
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terms, to the arena of industrial development. The bureaucrats from the
developing countries decide what amount of incremental utility will be added to
benefit the minority "privileged class" at the expense of the majority "lower
class" within the developing countries, and, as a result, the loser is the
majority." What this amounts to is a further growth of inequality within the
developing nations-an expansion of the class system. Interestingly, these
competent bureaucratic elites, who adopted for themselves the responsibility of
protecting the interests of the majorities in developing countries, have caused
further damage to the interests of their own majority. It may appear to be a
correct strategy, but, in fact, it is a voluntary infliction of harm on the poor
majority by the very people the majority trusted to protect their interests.
C. Development, Economic Cooperation, and the History of InternationalLaw
With the advent of the industrial revolution and the European colonization
of distant nations came a long era of dominance of large corporations. These
businesses were incorporated in colonizing countries and were encouraged by
their respective governments to expand their businesses to colonies.' 33 If the
difficulties faced by the fictitious personalities, even before they were recognized
as corporations, are kept in mind, the problems faced today can be better
recognized. Professor Stone correctly pointed out in his famous discourse,
Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, that "trusts, corporations, joint
ventures, municipalities... and nation states" all went through a difficult legal
conceptual battle because all these concepts were found to be "jarring notions"

132. In India, mostly poor people live near industrial complexes and are dependent on the labor
economy that grows around these complexes. These people live illegally on government land and
have small restaurants or cigarette shops, etc., located in the vicinity of the industrial plants. By
permitting these people to live in such close proximity of hazardous activity against the zoning laws,
both the politicians and the middle class gain. While the politicians gain by attracting votes, the
middle class gains by secluding raw poverty from more affluent areas through keeping the poor
masses confined to hazardous localities. The situation serves a dual purpose of supporting political
gain and keeping unwanted people away from middle- and upper-class localities. The utilitarian
concept believes in increasing the sum total of utility, and to this end it is believed that an
incremental utility taken from the minority and given to the majority is justified, to the extent that
it helps increase the sum total of utility. The sum total so achieved will have an effect of providing
greater utilitarian satisfaction to a larger number of people and will thus lead to increased efficiency.
In a third world scenario, quite often the minority of the upper class completely disregards the
existence of the poor, takes away their benefits or utility, and adds this incremental utility to their
own. Thus, while there is a utility transfer, it is not from minority to majority but from majority
to minority. Therefore, the sum total thus achieved completely neglects the existence of the poor
as a participant in utilitarian assessment (utilitarianism in reverse order).
133. See generally DONALD WINCH, CLASSICAL POUxTICAL ECONOMY AND COLONIES (1965)
(examining the political economies of colonies); SMITH, supra note 96, at 62-97 (remarking on the
motives for establishing new colonies); James Mill, Colony, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
257-73 (Supp. to 4th, 5th, & 6th eds. 1824). For an examination of international trade in the last
century, see generally MILL, supra note 96, at 574-82.
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by the jurists of yesteryears."
Even in modem times, the recognition of
children's rights, the rights of the insane, and the rights of blacks did not come
easy. Therefore, it is obvious that to change the order of the day, opposition
from the bureaucratic elite, the modem Vattalists, must be faced before there
can be any success in transforming the current system so as to recognize the
realities of the last decade of this century and those ahead in the next century.
This approach will have to be different from the contemporary realist consensus.
There is a marked difference between the realists of today and the realist
visionaries. The latter are able to predict the problems of tomorrow and provide
realistic answers for the future.
Professor Henkin writes that "the need for modem international law can be
found in primitive, rudimentary economic law between peoples." 35 Richard
Cobden, a British leader, said in 1850: "I believe Free Trade would have the
tendency to unite mankind in the bonds of peace." l" History is full of
examples where interstate relations were established for economic activity
resulting in new treaties and agreements.
An important beginning for
international law was made when, in the fifteenth century, an agreement between
the merchants of various cities was made to permit the exchange of information
through a commercial post. Thus,
an era of interstate communication was born
37
with very modest beginnings.
The emergence of trade-related international agreements can be traced
through the 1886-90 Berne Convention between eight states, the 1888 Treaty for
the freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal, and the 1903 Treaty for the
administration of the Panama Canal."
Other later developments such as the
international postal union,' 39 international telecommunication,1 ° sea trans-

134. Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-TowardLegal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL.L. Rav. 450, 452 (1972). For a historical review of the developments leading
to the recognition of corporations as legal entities, see BLUMBERG, supra note 83, at 3-20 (citing
Carr, EarlyForms of Corporations,in 3 SELECT ESSAYS INANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 161
(1909); C. COOKE, CORPORATION TRUST AND COMPANY (1951); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw 469-90 (5th ed. 1942); L. GOWER, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPA NY LAW
25-41 (4th ed. 1979); Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business CorporationsBefore 1800
(pt. 2), 2 HARv. L. REv. 149, 164 (1888)). For a look at the Roman Law roots of corporations,
see W.W. BUCKLAND, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW (F. Lawson ed., 2d ed. 1965); 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *467, *469, *470, *472, *478.
135. LouiS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAvE 200 (2d ed. 1979), quoted in 4 Manfred Lachs,
Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of InternatonalLaw, 169 RECUEIL DES CouRs 85 n.277
(1980).
136. 2 R. COBDEN, SPEECHES ON QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC POUCY 421 (John Bright & lames
E. Thorold Rogers eds., 1870).
137. Lachs, supra note 135, at 87.
138. Id. at 87-88.
139. EVAN LUARD, INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES 11-26 (1977).
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clearly demonstrate that the necessity for greater international economic
interaction has caused the world community to structure different international
regimes. Even though states resist any control of their liberty or freedom, they
have willingly accepted controls that come from these specialized international
agencies for economic development.
However, the habit of thinking internationally on purely economic problems
has lagged behind other areas of necessity. "The present divorce between the
schools of political economy and law seems to me," wrote the great lawyer
Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1897, "evidence of how much progress in
philosophical study still remains to be made." 15 In 1944, Brierly observed
that "international law is still very definitely in the laissez-faire stage of social
development. Without welfare for the world international law is impotent. "
Professor Friedmann, in his 1969 lecture at The Hague, emphasized a need for
"cooperation" as an essential element of the life of every state."* Judge
Manfred L.achs of the International Court, while hoping that the Code of
Conduct for Transnational Corporations might acquire the status of customary
international law, said that one day when "ultimate formulation seems an
historical necessity,""4 and the "need for a new economic order may, in
world dimension, become even more urgent,"'4 9 we will then cooperate,
regardless of whether we are a western, socialist, or third world state.
There is a common sentiment here that the great international jurists, such
as Holmes, Brierly, Friedmann, and Lachs, have echoed over a period stretching
almost a century: there is a need to recognize the existing divorce between the
international political economy and the welfare of the community of nations or
mankind. Of the TNCs, Professor Gilpin writes that "the scope of operations
and extent of the territory over which some multinational corporations range are

140. Id. at 27-43.
141. Id. at 44-62.
142. Id. at 63-79.
143. See generallyDevelopments in the InternationalLaw of Telecommunications, 1989 AM.
SoC. INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 385, 385-402.
144. Luard, supra note 139, at 107-19.
145. Holmes, supra note 1, at 474. CY. Richard Falk, Economic Aspecu of Global Cvilizaton:
The Unmet Challenges of World Poverty, in WORLD ORDER STUDIES PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER
NuMER 22, at 1 (1992); see also MONDALE POLICY FORUM UNIVERSITY OF INNESOTA
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, THE CHALLEINGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(Feb. 4-5, 1993).
146. J.L. BRiERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (1944).

29-34

147. W. Friedmann, General Course in PublicIntenationalLaw, 127 RBCUEIL DES COURS 96
(1969).
148. Lachs, supra note 135, at 102.
149. Id.
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more expansive geographically than any empire that has ever existed.""s'
These corporations "have integrated the world economy more extensively than
ever in the past, and they have taken global economic interdependence beyond
the realms of trade and money into the area of industrial production."' 51 In
his opinion, "internationalization of production impinges significantly on national
economies. " " Even though we have increasingly become interdependent on
other countries for our welfare, we have mostly remained a system of
laissez-faire international business activity. Primarily, it is due to our desire to
maintain "freedom" or "liberty," and this factor continues to dictate the terms
of international business or corporate activity. In reality, this desire to maintain
freedom or liberty is causing many nations to lose capital, sophisticated
technology, and knowledge. Professor Radhakrishnan, former President of India
and the greatest philosopher of Hindu philosophy in recent centuries, wrote that
"[t]his is an age of interdependence [in which we] must surrender a part of our
sovereignty, [and] work together for the elimination of every kind of injustice
.
,,m
153It
is amply clear that the diplomats of vision fully appreciate the
emerging global order that signifies not only interdependence, but also a
compelling necessity for the dilution of sovereignty-a willingness to
compromise on liberty and equality. There is an urgent need for building a new
global regime that can deliver some degree of satisfaction to the aspirations of
mankind by assuring cooperation and welfare to developing countries.
Concerning the TNCs, Judge Lachs, in his 1980 Hague Academy lecture, said
that "the situation seemed not to have been ripe for the elaboration of a binding
agreement but merely for that of a code of conduct. " " Judge Lachs is clearly
disappointed in the softest of the soft law nature of the Code of Conduct for
Transnational Corporations. He admits that the time may not have been ripe for
the development of lex lata-hard law-but he expects that the code so
developed ought to have been given an opportunity to evolve into, at least, lex
frenda-soft law. There are binding treaties, less binding resolutions, and
customary law. The resolutions which are somewhat consistent and have stood
the test of time may acquire the force of customary law; however, a code of
conduct with no definite adherents will always remain a code and nothing more.
The same problems that all fictitious legal entities faced before they were
accepted as part of the legal phenomenon will exist. However, to say that the
status of TNCs cannot be legalized is as wrong as the suggestion that blacks and
women cannot have voting rights or that there is no standing for non-sentient

150. ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLTICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONALRE:ATIONS 231-32 (1987).

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. SARVEPALij RADHAKRISHNAN, TOWARDS A NEW WORLD 14 (1983). This book is a
collection of Professor Radhaklishnan's speeches delivered at various United Nations meetings over
a period extending more than two decades.
154. Lachs, supra note 135, at 101-02.
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objects. Many scholars referred to in this section have urged the necessity for
bringing a harmony between the international political economy and moral and
political philosophy. The latter's objective is to establish a just global social
order.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GLOBALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN TRANSNATIONAL Bususs ACTIVrrY

At the beginning of this Article, it was suggested that the Bhopal case is
different from the other accidents. Later it was suggested that the Seveso
incident was perhaps the closest to Bhopal, because both had a common factor:
hazardous activity of TNCs operating in a foreign country. If we were to seek
solutions based on a few isolated incidents, we would create narrowly conceived
remedies. The problem is much more complex than the accidents reveal. The
factors that cause distrust need to be recognized. They are: 1) the domestic
laws, practices, and perceptions of the bureaucratic and political elite relating
to hazardous activity; 2) international law, codes of conduct, declarations, and
the psychological perceptions of the diplomatic elite regarding human welfare,
equality, and freedom; 3) the long history of the economic exploitation of
developing countries, the history of reluctance to adopt new methods to deal
with emerging problems, and the recent escalation of the global activities of
TNCs that has made the global economy completely interdependent; and 4) the
recent awareness about the ineffectiveness of the fragmented nature of
environmental laws that are unlikely to provide protection from hazardous
activity, which has created an atmosphere of mutual global distrust. These
problems must be addressed to create a trusting environment conducive to resultoriented negotiations. To create such an environment, a global institution based
on democratic principles and combining both competence and popular
representation must be structured.
The ultimate effect of these conflicts is that the developing countries suffer
under the self-imposed restrictions on the importation of sophisticated
technology. Multinationals suffer because they are not allowed to operate in
optimum conditions.' 3 In the long run, such accidents either may cause them
considerable loss in competitive markets or may make the consumer pay for the
fault of others.
People of developing countries suffer from economic,
environmental, and developmental loss. The only factor that will rescue the

155. This could, though, be argued both ways. While multinationals suffer because they are
not allowed to use more efficient means of technology, they also gain by using cheap labor.
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developing countries from the dire prophecy of Malthusian predictions" is the
bitter medicine of the dilution of liberty leading to technology transfer."17 In
the final analysis, this interaction with efficient technologies will save millions
from the raw poverty and starvation that seems to be as certain as death. "
To seek solutions to the problems raised in this study, the issues identified by
Professors Allott, Falk, Macdonald, Johnston, Morris, and Judge Lachs must
be considered. The role of psychology, perception, and mentality must not be
underestimated, for in it lies the cause of all problems. The causation chain of
59
mutual distrust in this situation seems to be founded on behavioral elements.1
It is not an easy task, however, to identify the basic parameters and then
to build an institutional structure that might provide the basis for further inquiry
by more informed scholars. We need a comprehensive global regulatory regime
covering all aspects of transnational corporate activity that not only endorses the
practice of equality in principle, but voluntarily follows it in practice. First, the
plans need to be designed so that international business activities are compatible
with the aspirations of the people of the host countries, as well as the objectives
of multinationals. Second, these activities should be carried through without
severely impinging the legitimate expectations of any party. Third, the
execution of these plans should lead to the achievement of the social ends of
economic development without sacrificing the ecological sanctity of our planet
in ways that are efficient and consistent with global social justice. Fourth, the
scheme of international social cooperation must be stable. Fifth, these rules
must be regularly complied with and willingly acted upon. If and when
infractions occur, the apex organization should act as a stabilizing force to
prevent further violations and to restore the arrangement of safe and ecologically

156. See generally PAUL KENNEDY, PREPARING FOR THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY (1993).
Professor Kennedy insists that because of the global forces that challenge all societies, a change
towards integration ought to prevail over those who merely desire to erect a large trading
consortium. He further says that the chances of demographically driven struggles, resource wars,
mass migration, looming population imbalances between North and South, and the long term dangers
of environmental dangers must be addressed collectively.
157. Developing countries must allow multinationals to transfer their most advanced and
environmentally safe technology, while the multinationals must stop exploiting the poor and the
cheap labor resources of the developing countries.
158. See generally Robert Kurfirst, Beyond Malthusianism: Demographyand Technology in
John Swart Mill's StationaryState, 3 UTIuAs 53 (1991). See also MILL, supra note 96, at 746-51;
ROLL, supra note 96, at 334-35. "The increase of wealth, Mill thought, must sometime come to
an end and society must enter upon a stationary condition."
159. This problem can be traced to economic theories. See generally Amartya Sen, Rational
Fools! A Critique of the BehaviouralFoundationsof Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS
317 (1977).
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sound business practices.1"
The following objectives in a new transnational legal regime for multinational corporate activity must be pursued. First, the terms and conditions of
such activity must promote the cause of global economic and social justice.
Second, there must be global standards of process safety for transnational
hazardous and nonhazardous business activity. Third, the activity must satisfy
the highest standards of environmental protection. Fourth, the activity must
observe the highest standards of human rights. Fifth, dilution of technology to
a lesser level while operating in developing countries should be banned, even if
the importing nation so desires. Sixth, restrictions against foreign capital
investment in developing economies should be set, regulated, and reviewed by
an impartial committee consisting of the representatives from both developed and
developing countries, but excluding the parties in question so that the solutions
agreed upon are free from the psychological biases of interested parties. Last,
an international dispute resolution mechanism should be established where
preference is accorded to arbitration before appealing the decision to a court of
binding jurisdiction.
A comprehensive global approach towards liability prevention can go a long
way in establishing healthy trade practices. By establishing such principles, not
only will the possibility of environmental disasters be reduced, but also liability
for observing different standards in different locations will be effectively
avoided. Such a scheme will have to go beyond primary environmental
concerns because factors such as recycling, health standards, and employees'
rights to know about the hazards associated with particular activities are
increasingly being incorporated into national and international standards.
However, so long as these standards remain fragmented and scattered, their
effectiveness will remain spotty and questionable. The only answer to the
quandary lies in the globalization of the issues, concerns, and objectives that fall
within the sphere of transnational business activity.
To attain these objectives, we need to structure a treaty that essentially
establishes an International Company Law. We can profit by the experience of
the European Community. However, we must not fall into the trap that the
European Community seems to have fallen into-issuing too many directives and
causing an utterly confused state of environmental standards. We need a treaty
that provides for a new international organization, similar to the International
Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organisation, or the
International Postal Union. The new organization must not only protect the

160. This scheme of general principles has been borrowed from John Rawls and is given here
in a paraphrased version as it may apply to international situations. A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra
note 77, at 6.
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interests of developing countries, but also prevent the bureaucratic mentality
from lowering the human rights standards or the pollution standards and risk
perceptions simply because the lives of the citizens of developing countries
appear to be less significant than their so-called tactical victories in the exercise
of liberty. A human is a human and, therefore, must be treated with dignity by
both the bureaucratic elite of the developing countries and the TNCs.
All this can be achieved by bringing the functions of several United Nations
agencies that relate to the activities of TNCs under one organization. The U.N.
Commission on Transnational Corporations can serve as the starting point.
Some functions of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, especially
those relating to the new international economic order, the Code of Conduct for
Transnational Corporations, and the ILO standards, need to be brought together
and dealt with in a new organization. Such a treaty should create a Board for
Multinational Business Activity with both judicial and administrative
functions. 61
All corporations that are involved in transnational business
activity must be required to register as TNCs with the Board. These
corporations can be divided into two categories: first, those corporations that
have production facilities in more than one country, and, second, those
corporations that export their finished products to one or more countries, but
their production facilities are confined to one nation. The Board, in addition to
registering such corporations, should make sure that the technology being
transferred is state-of-the-art, safe, and environmentally responsive. There
should be one uniform standard for risk perceptions, process safety,
environmental health, recycling, packaging, and products liability. 2 The
Board should maintain records of the levels of scientific advancement. Further,
all corporations that operate outside the country of their incorporation must
convince the Board that the product safety, process safety, and efficiency
standards are the same at all of the plants of that corporation regardless of their
location, allowing some regard for the older facilities and the time needed to
bring them up to the safest standards. A Commission should be established
within the Board to look into the matters related to restrictive trade practices that
are likely to give unfair advantages to large corporations. A company registered
as a multinational corporation should be the parent company, while other units
should be treated as subsidiaries. Such incorporation will give them certain
protection against problems such as arbitrary nationalization of their property.

161. The European Community (EC) is a perfect example of an organization with both
administrative and judicial powers. However, in the EC, these powers are entrusted to separate
organs of the Community. For another example of combined judicial and legislative powers,
examine the role of the House of Lords in the Westminster system of government in Britain.
Perhaps a combination of the EC and the House of Lords will be more suitable for the Board for
Multinational Business Activity.

162. This will require negotiation of another convention inthe area of private international law.
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With regard to taxation, each unit should be taxed in the country of its
operation, while the parent multinational should be taxed by the Board of
Multinational Corporations. A global auditing mechanism for risk assessment
and product and process safety will ensure an environmentally safer trade.
One very important aspect is the membership of the Board. The classical
principles of representative government that have now been experimented with
by the European Community should be followed, including a balance between
popular representation and competence. There should be a general assembly
based on proportional representation where members are directly elected by
people from various countries. To balance the popular representation, another
chamber should be created where governments may nominate both governmental
and company representatives to provide for competence as well as to protect
their national and business interests.
With this approach, a sense of global justice that can be described as fair
international law relating to global commerce can be introduced. Extending
these norms to cover the behavior of states vis-a-vis state and corporate entities
is not a matter of choice, but a matter of necessity. John Rawls' theory of
justice requires that the parties, before beginning negotiations, must be unaware
of their strengths and weaknesses." There must be circumstances of justice,
formal constraints of the concept of rights, and rationality of the parties before
an institutional structure of the society can be constructed.'" Once these
factors are satisfied, the issue of liberty"
and equality'6 can be
negotiated. " In our scenario, we face a slightly different situation. The
principle negotiators are states who will negotiate not only for their interests, but

163. Rawls has stated:
This assures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by
the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstance. Since all are
similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition
the principles of justice are result of a fair agreement or bargain.
A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 12.
164. Thomas Frank & Steven Hawkins, Justice in the Intrnational System, 10 MICH.J. INT'L
L. 133-34 (1989). See also A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 126-36.
165. "[E]ach [party] is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible
with a similar liberty for others." A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 60; Frank & Hawkins,
supra note 159, at 135.
166. The principle of equality states that the "[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are... to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged .... " A THEORY OF
JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 83; Frank & Hawkins, supra note 159, at 135. For a critique of Rawls'
discussion of international problems, see generally ANTHONY D'AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE: A
DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW 259-76 (1984); Anthony D'Amato, International
Law and Rawis' Theory of Justice, 5 DENY. J. INT'L L. PoL'Y 525 (1975).
167. For fuirther elaboration of Rawls' conception of justice in a global setting, see THOMAS
POGGE, REALING RAwis 280-311 (1989).
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also for the interests of third-party TNCs. To expect that they can be or will
be unaware of their weaknesses, vulnerability, and strengths is unrealistic.
Other factors such as circumstances warranting justice, constraints on the
concept of rights, and rationality do exist in an international setting. There is
no doubt that the underlying issues of the conflict that continue to thwart
mankind's interests are liberty and equality. The question then becomes-can
we benefit from the Rawlsian framework and construct an international regime
based on his conception of justice? The answer is yes; we can, with some
modifications. "
The recommendations contained in this Article will most certainly make
both developed and developing countries uncomfortable, for neither wants to
relinquish its liberty associated with sovereignty. However, at least this Article
does not suggest a solution that will satisfy both the haves and the have nots by
maintaining the status quo. The idea here is to displease the elite from both
sides while building a regime that benefits the masses. The intention is to move
away from the perceptions of trained ignorance-the ones who seem to know it
all yet, in actuality, know very little about the masses. Someone must remind
these public servants that very reason they negotiate international conventions
is to represent the interests of the masses. They are doing a gross disservice not
only to mankind, but to their nations, by rigidly adhering to their narrowly
conceived perceptions and objectives.
Let me conclude by saying that Bhopal and the other accidents should not
be treated as grim reminders of destiny and should not be forgotten as still mere
episodes of the cost-benefit era. It will be a pity if "we, the people," who like
to call ourselves civilized, fail to realize the priceless beauty of our planet that
has sustained our lives, and the lives of our ancestors, and the necessity of
uplifting the downtrodden from raw poverty. The ideas expressed in the
conclusion are, at best, fragments of a paradigm that has become a necessity in
an era eclipsed by Malthusian prophecy. Many learned, informed scholars and
pragmatists might find a degree of absurdity in the propositions presented in this
discourse. My only suggestion is that we think not as individuals, a nation, or
an interest group, but as one who looks at the grim realities of the world while
searching from within for a solution that can at least mitigate the sufferings of
the poor, if not alleviate them altogether. Besides the business of moneymaking, multinational corporations also need to realize their responsibility
toward global social justice. They need to help reduce the inequity between the
haves and have nots while respecting the sanctity of the planet earth. Professor

168. See generally JOHN RAwLS, POuTIcAL LIBERAuSM (1993). Professor Rawls has modified
his theory of justice, which now accommodates a plurality of incompatible doctrines-religion,
moral, philosophical, and cultural. All of them coexist within the framework of a democratic
regime.
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Borgese wrote in 1953 that "the era of humanity has not begun, but the age of
Is it not yet the time to start the era of humanity?
nations has ended."'

169. BOROESE, supra noe 126, at 3.
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